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LOVERS' CONTRACTS IN THE COURTS: FORSAKING THE
MINIMUM DECENCIES
JUDITH T. YOUNGER*
Or for every prenuptial, is it now a must
That you treat your betrothed with presumptive
mistrust?
- Judge Michael Eakin'
INTRODUCTION
People in intimate relationships - spouses or lovers, prospective
spouses or lovers - make all kinds of promises to each other.2 So long
as harmony reigns between the couple, the law is unconcerned with
the content, coerciveness, or impact of these lovers' deals. When the
parties disagree, however, and one seeks to enforce a promise while
the other seeks to avoid it, the law must take some stand. The law
treats most of these mutual promises as "domestic" and therefore out-
side the realm of enforceable contracts.3 It singles out one group of
* Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family Law,
University of Minnesota. The author would like to thank Brandon L. Raatikka, her
research assistant, without whose language skills, brilliance, and dedication this article
could not have been completed; Suzanne Thorpe, Associate Director for Faculty, Research,
and Instruction, and David M. Zopfi-Jordan, Interlibrary Loan and Document Librarian,
at the University of Minnesota Law School, both of whom worked indefatigably to get
needed materials; and all the others who graciously helped by sharing documents and
information: Hon. John H. Bailey, Jr., Judge of Superior Court, Northern Judicial
Circuit, Georgia; Hon. Marion D. Myers, Judge, Family Court for the Third Judicial
Circuit, South Carolina; Jane D.W. Bradstreet, Registrar, Probate Court, Merrimack
County, New Hampshire; Frederick P. Claussen, Register Probate and Family Court
Division, Barnstable County, Massachusetts; Wilda Elliott, Regional Clerk, Brentwood
Family Division, New Hampshire; Tracy Lurie, Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia;
Robert E. McCarthy, the Trial Court, Probate, and Family Court Department, Plymouth
Division, Massachusetts; Ouida Puryear, Circuit Court Administrator, Second Judicial
Circuit, Arkansas; Debra Simenson, Clerk of District Court, Burleigh County, North
Dakota; the New Hampshire Law Library; the Law and Legislative Reference Library,
Augusta, Maine; and last, but certainly not least, the attorneys: Charles Evans, Michael
L. Gjesdahl, Barbara Halsey, Scott Manatt, Mark F. Marshall, Loren C. McCray, Mitchell
A. Peterson, and Jan L. Warner.
1. Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 576 (Pa. 2002) (Eakin, J., dissenting).
2. As one group of commentators describes these promises:
Some are trivial; some are serious. They can range from agreements about
who will pick up the wine and who will shop for what is needed to make the
meal at a dinner party, to whether his elderly father will be invited to live
with them in the family home.
1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 250 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 Eng. Rep. 571, 580 (K.B.) (holding the
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agreements for potential enforcement: those dealing with the finan-
cial details of the couple's ultimate breakup. This group contains both
premarital and postmarital agreements, which typically alter state-
prescribed property rights otherwise available to the couple on dis-
solution of their marriage, and cohabitation agreements, which can
create marriage-like property rights for the couple for whom the state
provides none. Two common threads link all three groups: (1) the
agreements are made in relationships in which the financial domi-
nance of one member of the couple enables him to impose greater fi-
nancial risk on the other member than she4 would otherwise have
chosen,' and (2) parties to the agreements contract about the disso-
lution of their relationships, possible future events the effects of which
are hard to anticipate.6
This article focuses on disputes over the enforcement of pre-
marital, postmarital, and cohabitation agreements that reached the
highest state courts in American jurisdictions. It covers cases liti-
gated since 2000, a period of time when marriage has been the subject
of emotional public debate between those who want to preserve and
strengthen it in its traditional form and those who want to change it
in some critical way.7 In the wake of all the talk, people continue to
agreement was not a binding legal contract but was instead an ordinary domestic
arrangement); Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464, 465 (Iowa 1887) (holding the contract was
without consideration).
4. This author uses pronouns that reflect the greater reality. Men are almost always
proponents of these agreements; women are almost always the challengers. Most repre-
sented parties had male lawyers. This article therefore uses masculine pronouns for pro-
ponents and lawyers; female pronouns for challengers. In the discussions of specific cases
the pronouns match the actual parties' sexes.
5. Michael J. Trebilcock & Steven Elliott, The Scope and Limits of Legal Paternalism:
Altruism and Coercion in Family Financial Arrangements, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW: NEW ESSAYS 45, 52 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
6. Id. at 52-53. These agreements differ from separation agreements, which the
parties negotiate at the end of their relationships. In separation agreements the events
about which the parties are contracting are imminent; the parties are therefore more
likely to be dealing at arm's length and better able to advance and protect their indi-
vidual interests. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.09 cmt. b (2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. Furthermore, sepa-
ration agreements are frequently subject to oversight by the trial court. Id. § 7.09 cmt.
d. This article does not cover them, but see Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529 (Pa. 2003),
discussed infra notes 320-331 and accompanying text (technically involving a separation
agreement but analyzed as if it were a premarital or postmarital agreement under
Pennsylvania law).
7. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining marriage for federal
purposes as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife");
Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage: Let's Really Get the Government Out of Our Bedrooms,
WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at A23 (advocating a completely privatized marriage regime,
one with no legal significance); Family Research Council, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=
ABOUTFRC (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) (asserting that "[g]overnment has a duty to pro-
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marry, divorce, cohabit, and part. The discernible pattern is one of
increasingly serial relationships.8 As a result, breakup planning be-
comes more popular and more important. In addition, the cases yield
information about current attitudes to marriage, love, money, and the
roles of courts and lawyers, and raise again the question of whether
marital and cohabitation agreements should ever be enforced.9
Part I of this article contains an introductory history of each type
of agreement. It surveys the kinds of cases litigated, standards for re-
view, and, using premarital agreements as the template,1" the special
rules of fairness developed for assessing their validity. Part II reviews
the cases decided from 2000 to the present. Part III discusses some
troubling emerging trends: conflicting cases within single jurisdictions
and other judicial errors, the decline of substantive review with a con-
comitant disregard for dependent spouses, and the mythification of
procedural fairness. This article concludes the discussion by offering
three possible solutions to achieve just results: (1) enforcing only those
contracts for which both sides had independent representation, and
a rule that two kinds of contracts, those that leave dependent spouses
on welfare and those that fail to provide for reasonable support for
homemaker spouses, are unconscionable as a matter of law and there-
fore unenforceable; (2) requiring advance judicial approval at the time
of execution, based on a court's determination that the contract is in
the best interests of the parties and that they understand the govern-
ing principles and rules; or (3) ceasing to enforce these agreements
altogether but according the agreements advisory value for what the
parties apparently thought was fair at the time of execution.
mote and protect [traditional] marriage and family in law and public policy"); Freedom
To Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/about.asp (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) (stating
that the Freedom to Marry organization "encourages dialogue with Americans thinking
through the need to end discrimination in marriage" and advocates legal recognition of
'same-sex marriage").
8. See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS SER. 23, No. 22, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (2002).
9. See also Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Should Marital Property Rights Be
Inalienable? Preserving the Marriage Ante, 82 NEB. L. REV. 460, 462-63 (2003) (deeming
marital property rights "inchoate" that should not be waivable until the time of divorce,
when such rights can be expressly valued); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts
and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 69 (1998) (concluding that policy reasons
for not enforcing nonmonetary agreements should lead the legal community to "seriously
rethink the trend toward enforcement of monetary terms at death or divorce" as well).
10. Those agreements have the longest history of potential enforcement, are the
favorite tools for private breakup planning, and account for most of the litigation in this
area. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT pref. note (1983); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note
6, § 7.09 cmt. b.
2007]
352 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:349
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF LOVERS' CONTRACTS
A. A Brief History
Of the three kinds of agreements, premarital agreements are
both the most venerable and voguish. They first appeared in six-
teenth century England when litigants began to ask chancery and
common law courts to enforce them." Couples used them to alter the
marital property regime that would otherwise apply to them, and,
more specifically, to endow married women with proprietary capac-
ity. 2 Premarital agreements soon became important enough to be
joked about in Shakespeare's plays 3 and incorporated into the orig-
inal Statute of Frauds. 4 In America premarital agreements prescrib-
ing consequences upon death of a spouse won early acceptance.
15
Courts did not receive premarital agreements dealing with divorce
as readily. Some courts held them void ab initio as contrary to public
policy because they were thought to encourage divorce.' 6 Starting
around 1970, as divorce was becoming easier and more common-
place, judicial attitudes changed.17 Premarital agreements, whether
triggered by death or divorce, now have equal chances for enforce-
ment, are tested by identical standards, and have become the tool
of choice for private breakup planning." Courts and legislatures
acknowledge their difference from ordinary contracts and therefore
accord them different treatment. 9 In 1983 the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and promulgated
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act in an effort to eliminate un-
certainty and create uniformity in the treatment of these agree-
ments.2 ° The Act applies only to agreements triggered by divorce.2'
11. See 5 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310-12 (1924).
12. Id. at 310.
13. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 2, sc. 1. Premarital
agreements continue their English theatrical career into the Restoration with William
Congreve. See WILLIAM CONGREVE, THE WAY OF THE WORLD act 4, sc. 1, in THE COMPLETE
PLAYS OF WILLIAM CONGREVE 389, 449-52 (Herbert Davis ed. 1967).
14. An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuryes, 1677, 29 Car. II, c.3 (Eng).
15. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 72.
16. See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970); Brooks v. Brooks, 733
P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Alaska 1987).
17. See Posner, 233 So.2d at 385; Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049.
18. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. e; see, e.g., Posner, 233 So.2d at 385.
19. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. a.
20. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, pref. note (1983). Similarly in 2000, the
American Law Institute adopted and promulgated its Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, chapter 7 of which applies to agreements. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.0 1-
7.12. Its scope is broader than the Uniform Act in that it covers premarital, postmarital,
cohabitation, and separation agreements. Id. § 7.01 cmt. b. Its application, however, is
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Although twenty-six states have passed the Act,22 the cases within
the scope of this article demonstrate that by and large it has not
achieved its goals.
Postmarital agreements were impossible in England under the
common law system because the law considered spouses a single
person, embodied in the husband.23 In contrast, the civil law system
prevailing in France and Spain considered spouses to be two sepa-
rate individuals.24 Each spouse had control of his or her own separate
property and was to be an equal partner in community assets.2" Be-
cause the husband was the exclusive manager of the community, pre-
sumptively only he could contract with third parties with respect to
community assets;26 if he consented, the wife could also make such
contracts.2" The spouses could contract with each other for dividing,
of the New World br sharing, or owning earnings and gains during
marriage.28 Settlers ought both common law and civil law systems,
although the common law exerted a pernicious influence on the civil
law, diminishing the wife's ownership in her separate property by
making the husband its manager and reducing her interest in the
community assets from a "partnership" to a mere expectancy.29 It was
not until the Married Women's Property Acts were passed in the mid-
nineteenth century that wives in the common law states were given
separate legal capacity, including the power to contract with respect
to their property, and wives in community property states regained
the power to manage their separate assets.3 ° Wives' empowerment
as true partners in the community had to await the advent of an
expanded equal protection doctrine and the passage of state equal
similarly limited to divorce or the equivalent and does not apply on dissolution of relation-
ships by death. Id. Its enunciated goals with respect to premarital agreements were similar
to those of the Uniform Act, namely to achieve consensus on the appropriate rules to
apply and the rationales offered to explain them. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. a.
21. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, pref. note (1983).
22. Id.
23. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
24. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 37, 59, at 55, 116 (2d ed. 1971).
25. Id. § 60, at 116-17 (explaining the presumptions relating to spouses' property under
Spanish civil law). The Spanish civil law displaced French civil law in North America. Id.
26. Id. § 61, at 125.
27. Id. § 116, at 283-84.
28. Id. § 59, at 116.
29. See Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together With Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 45, 53-59 (1981).
30. See id. at 61-63 (recounting the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts in
American jurisdictions).
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rights amendments during the 1970s; as a result these women can
31now contract with third parties with respect to community assets.
Thus, postnuptial agreements have a much shorter history of enforce-
ment when compared to premarital agreements; they are not made
or litigated as frequently and face even more uncertainty in court.32
Cohabitation agreements are the youngest and rarest of the
trio.33 That cohabitants might have enforceable rights arising from
their relationships is certainly not new to the law. Common law mar-
riages in existence in England before Lord Hardwicke's Act 34 could
be founded on mere agreements to marry or promises to marry in the
future followed by consummation.35 Similarly, putative marriages,
based on the good faith belief of a spouse that he or she was validly
married, were recognized by the civil law system. 36 Couples in com-
mon law or putative marriages acquire all the rights and obligations
of marriage, 7 becoming just as "married" as those who engage in cer-
emonial marriages. Cohabitants who do not qualify as common law
or putative spouses may now appeal to contractual or equitable doc-
trines to settle the economic consequences of their breakups.3 A few
states have been interested enough in cohabitants to enact statutes
of frauds for their agreements39 or alternative property regimes for
their relationships.4 ° Parties rarely make written cohabitation agree-
ments.41 In the typical case, one party asks the court to find an al-
leged oral or implied agreement over the other's objection.42 There-
fore, the court must decide first whether an agreement exists, and,
if so, whether to enforce it.
31. See id. at 74-75.
32. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 474-89 (discussing the Tennessee
postnuptial agreement case Bratton v. Bratton).
33. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 6.03 cmt. b.
34. Marriage Act, 1753, 26 Geo. 2, c. 33 (Eng.).
35. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAw 223 (3d
ed. 2006).
36. DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 24, § 56, at 96. Some reformed common law
states have adopted the doctrine. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.055 (2006) (granting a
putative spouse the legal rights of a legally married spouse until she gains knowledge that
she is not legally married).
37. See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 24, § 56, at 95-97.
38. Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1391
(2001).
39. See, e.g., TEX. Bus & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (2006) (providing that premarital
and cohabitation agreements must be in writing to be enforceable); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
513.075 (2005) (providing that agreements between cohabitants are only enforceable if
they are in writing and signed by the parties).
40. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2006) (Vermont's civil union statute).
41. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 6.03 cmt. b.
42. See id.
LOVERS' CONTRACTS IN THE COURTS
B. General Principles for Testing a Contract's Validity, With
Premarital Agreements as Possible Templates
Initially a premarital, postmarital, or cohabitation agreement
must comply with the rules governing ordinary contracts, including
satisfying the requirement of consideration.4 For premarital agree-
ments, entering into the impending marriage constitutes consid-
eration.44 The authorities are divided about postmarital agreements,
with some holding that staying in the marriage is sufficient consid-
eration and others requiring additional mutual waivers of rights.45
Obviously neither the marriage itself nor the act of staying married is
possible consideration in the cohabitation cases. One might think that
entering the relationship or staying in it should suffice, but the courts
have decided otherwise, holding for the most part that agreements
will not be enforced if sexual services form an inseparable part of the
consideration.46 All three kinds of agreements differ from ordinary
contracts in the nature of the parties and the relationship between
them, their subject matter, and the probable lapse of considerable
time between their execution and potential enforcement.4" For these
reasons, legislatures and courts have developed additional rules for
testing premarital agreements,4" which in theory, if not in practice,
might easily apply to both postmarital and cohabitation agreements
as well.
The rules governing the validity of premarital agreements come
into play at two possible points in time: (1) they look back to the con-
tract's execution, and (2) they look forward to the time of attempted
enforcement.49 At execution, a court might test the agreement for both
procedural and substantive fairness as it does in the case of ordinary
contracts.5 ° At enforcement a court might take a second look at the
impact of the agreement on the challenging spouse to be sure that
43. "Ordinary contract" as used in this article means an agreement that is not a
premarital, postnuptial, or cohabitation contract.
44. See Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004).
45. See id. (asserting that marriage cannot be sufficient consideration under a post-
marital agreement because "past consideration cannot support a current promise");
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. c. (arguing that the distinction as to marriage's suf-
ficiency for consideration between prenuptial and postnuptial agreements "is not per-
suasive in the context of a legal regime of no-fault divorce in which either spouse is legally
entitled to end the marriage at any time").
46. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976).
47. See Judith T. Younger, Antenuptial Agreements, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 697,
699 (2001).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, UNITED STATES CONTRACT LAW §§ 5.1-5.3, at 93-107
(rev. ed. 1999) (outlining how courts "police" contracts).
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it does not impose a harsh, one-sided result.5' In practice, the times
and standards used by the courts in testing premarital agreements
can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction52 and, unfortunately, as this
article will demonstrate, sometimes from case to case within the
same jurisdiction.
Another important variable in assessing the validity of these
agreements is the official view of the parties' relationship.3 In some
states prospective spouses are in a confidential relationship as a
matter of law,54 in others they are not,55 and in still others the court
determines if they are in such a relationship based on the facts of the
case.56 Spouses are almost universally held to be in confidential rela-
tionships with each other.57 Cohabitants have equitable principles to
aid them58 and these principles may place them in a similar position
as those in confidential relationships. Parties in a confidential rela-
tionship have enhanced duties to each other: they owe each other the
utmost duty of good faith and full disclosure.5" If one secures a bene-
fit from the agreement, or the agreement greatly disfavors one of the
parties," a presumption may arise that the benefited party has exer-
cised undue influence or fraud. The net effect of such a presumption
is to require the party seeking enforcement of the agreement to carry
the burden of proving that the parties entered into it freely and volun-
tarily,6' thus relieving the challenger of the usual burden of proving
that they did not."
In testing premarital agreements for procedural and substantive
fairness, courts understandably treat procedure and substance as
closely related.63 If the substantive terms of the agreement seem fair
enough to the court, it is more willing to overlook defects in the bar-
gaining process.' Conversely, if the terms of the agreement seem
51. See Younger, supra note 47, at 701.
52. Id. at 717.
53. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972).
54. E.g., Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d 563, 566 (Md. 2005).
55. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 831 (Cal. 2000); Mallen v. Mallen 622 S.E.
2d 812, 815 (Ga. 2005).
56. Butler v. Butler, 347 A.2d 477, 480 (Pa. 1975).
57. See, e.g., Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 605 (Tenn. 2004).
58. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23 (Cal. 1976) (holding that
cohabitants can make express and implied contracts, and they also may utilize equitable
remedies such as quantum meruit and constructive and resulting trusts). Cohabitants
can use such equitable principles because they may not avail themselves of the marital
regime's protections. Id.
59. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972).
60. Sogg v. Nevada State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 784 (Nev. 1992).
61. See id.
62. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (1994).
63. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. e.
64. Id.
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especially unfair, the court will scrutinize procedures surrounding its
execution more closely.65 Courts are certainly not meticulous in distin-
guishing between procedure and substance and sometimes confuse
the two so thoroughly that the grounds of their decisions are com-
pletely obscured.66
The test of procedural fairness should center on the procurement
of the agreement, inquiring into the conduct of the parties and their
status vis-A-vis each other, in essence, how did they behave and what
were their circumstances? 7 To be fairly procured an agreement must
be voluntarily entered by each party." The inquiry into voluntari-
ness starts "as a common law review for fraud, overreaching or sharp
dealing."69 Additionally, it delves further, into "the circumstances of
the parties, their experience, the time of the signing of the agreement
in relation to the wedding and the representation of each party by in-
dependent counsel."7 °
Disclosure is also required.71 It is closely related to voluntariness 2
and can have two aspects: the financial status of the parties including
assets and income and the rights and obligations the parties would
have if no agreement existed.73 The dual character of disclosure fol-
lows from the nature of the agreements themselves. They contain
waivers or alterations in the schemes of marital property rights pre-
scribed by the states on dissolution of marriage.74 These rights take
on or lose economic value based on the spouses' assets and earnings.75
A waiver or alteration of such rights cannot be voluntary or fair if the
waiving spouse does not know both what rights she is giving up and
their value, which is illuminated by the other's financial status.6
Thus, disclosure of each party's financial status, including assets and
income, and knowledge of the parties' legal rights without the agree-
ment should be obligatory. Financial disclosure may be waived,77 or
65. Id.
66. See, for example, Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002), discussed infra notes
386-400 and accompanying text.
67. See Younger, supra note 47, at 700.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.04 cmt. f.
74. See id. These elements are found in both premarital and postmarital agreements.
Cohabitation agreements create marriage-like rights or obligations that obviously neither
party would otherwise have.
75. Younger, supra note 47, at 700.
76. Id.
77. Two states revised the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 6 language to avoid
the implication that disclosure can be waived. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g(a)(3)
(2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.7(2)(c) (2006).
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may become irrelevant because the challenging party had actual
knowledge of the other's finances. The extent of the required fi-
nancial disclosure varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and case
to case,'" depending on the relative sophistication of the parties, the
fairness of the substantive terms of the agreement, and other circum-
stances unique to the litigants. Courts and legislatures do not always
recognize that disclosure includes the property rights relinquished as
well as the finances of the parties.7 9 Indeed, as Part III asserts, they
tend to undervalue the importance of disclosure generally, thus dilut-
ing procedural fairness.
The inquiries into voluntariness and disclosure may lead a court
to conclude that the agreement resulted from procedural unconscio-
nability, sometimes described as an "absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties."' Although courts purport to insist on
substantive fairness at execution,81 it is an anomaly in the context
of premarital agreements. Most contain waivers by which the less
wealthy spouse gives up valuable rights, preserving the wealthier
spouse's assets for himself or his preferred beneficiaries. 2 Thus by
nature and purpose they are usually "unfair," and the measure of
their substantive fairness at execution can only be one of degree.
Courts rarely hold agreements invalid on this ground." Substantive
fairness at enforcement is focused on the impact of enforcing the
agreement against the party challenging it. 4 Such a review gives
the court an opportunity to consider events occurring since execution
of the agreement to avoid an unfair or unforeseeable result. Here,
again, the test may be anomalous; certainly the courts' tolerance for
harsh results appears to be increasing. In policing the substance of
agreements at both execution and enforcement, the courts may again
invoke the term "unconscionable."85 At execution it means that the
agreement contains "unreasonably favorable" terms for one of the
parties to the disadvantage of the other.8 6 At enforcement it means
78. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 6.01 cmt. b.
79. See, e.g., Stoner v. Stoner, 819 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 2003) (holding that disclosure
of statutory rights was not required for an enforceable postnuptial agreement).
80. FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 5.3, at 107 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
81. See, e.g., Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d 563, 584 (Md. 2005).
82. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817 (Cal. 2000). Typical rights
relinquished include an equitable or equal division of marital or community assets, con-
tinued support in the form of alimony or maintenance on divorce, and rights to elective
or intestate shares, homestead, and allowances on death of a spouse. See, e.g., id.
83. Since 2000 only one of the states' highest courts has invalidated an agreement
on the basis of substantive unfairness.
84. See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (1989).
85. See, e.g., Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E. 2d 812, 814 (Ga. 2005).
86. FARNSWORTH, supra note 50, § 5.3.
LOVERS' CONTRACTS IN THE COURTS
an unduly oppressive, harsh, or one-sided effect on the party against
whom enforcement is sought.1
7
II. THE CASES
A. Presentation Conventions
Most of the cases raise more than a single procedural or sub-
stantive issue, making attempts to classify them by subject matter
difficult. This article presents all the cases that raise one or more pro-
cedural issues together despite the fact that many implicate questions
of substance and interpretation as well." The cases that raise only
substantive issues are sorted into two groups: those dealing with par-
ticular subject matter as appropriate for contracting, such as spousal
support, and those dealing with substantive fairness of an agree-
ment's terms at execution or its impact at enforcement. Cases involv-
ing questions of interpretation are treated together. In all, the cases
present a legal disarray: conflicting results, misinterpretations of
agreements, harsh consequences for litigants, and seeming lack of
concern for legal ethics standards. Although the respective analyses
may vary, premarital, postmarital, and cohabitation agreement cases
are nevertheless presented together because common issues greatly
overshadow any differences.
B. Procedure
1. Voluntariness and the Foreign National Cases
In the much-publicized Bonds case 9 from California, a foreign-
born, unrepresented wife signed a premarital agreement on the eve
of her wedding to Major League Baseball player Barry Bonds.' In the
agreement, she waived all her rights to community property.91 After
a seven-year marriage that produced two children, the couple di-
vorced, and the wife challenged the voluntariness of the agreement.92
87. See id.; Richard A. Lord, Unconscionable Agreements, in 8 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS, § 18.10 (4th ed. 1998).
88. Notwithstanding this convention, Banks v. Evans, 64 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. 2002), dis-
cussed infra at notes 621-27 and accompanying text, is presented with other substantive
cases due to the unique substantive argument the wife advanced, even though she also
made a procedural challenge to the agreement.
89. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000).
90. Id. at 817.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 817, 820.
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Under the then applicable law,93 a California court could not enforce
a premarital agreement if it was not voluntarily entered.9 4 The bur-
den of proving involuntariness was on the challenger.95 After the trial
court found the agreement voluntarily entered and valid, the court of
appeals reversed and directed a retrial on the issue of voluntariness
in view of the fact that wife had not been represented at execution
of the agreement nor had she, in its opinion, knowingly waived her
right to representation.96 Upon special appeal, however, the California
Supreme Court found the agreement voluntary.97 It criticized the in-
termediate appellate court for giving too much weight to Mrs. Bonds's
lack of representation at execution, which it asserted had effectively
relieved her of the burden of proving involuntariness, contrary to the
legislature's express intent. 98
Apparently, the supreme court misgauged that intent; the
California legislature promptly registered its disapproval of the
Bonds decision by amending the law.99 Under the new statutory sub-
section, a premarital agreement will be "deemed" involuntary unless
the court makes certain specified findings.1"' Perhaps the most impor-
tant is the finding that the challenger was represented by independ-
ent counsel at execution of the agreement or, after being advised to
consult independent counsel, executed a written waiver of such repre-
sentation. 10' Other findings required for voluntariness are that an
unrepresented challenger was "fully informed of the terms and basic
effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations he or she
was giving up by signing."'0 2 The new subsection also requires a writ-
ing signed by an unrepresented challenger stating that the terms and
effect of the agreement were explained to her and naming the per-
son who gave the explanation." 3 The court's findings bearing on the
93. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (2000).
94. Id.
95. Id.; but see PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.04 (substitutes "informed consent" for
"voluntariness" and places the burden of proving it on the proponent).
96. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 820 (Cal. 2000).
97. Id. at 833-34.
98. Id. at 836. In conjecturing further on legislative intent, the supreme court expressed
the view that by adopting the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, the legislature did not
intend the voluntariness of a premarital agreement to be examined as if the prospective
spouses were in a fiduciary or confidential relationship. Id. at 832.
99. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c) (2006).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. Additionally, the new subsection provides that the challenger have at least
seven days between presentation of the agreement and being advised to consult counsel
and the time the agreement was signed, that the challenger was proficient in the lan-
guage of the explanation and the language of the agreement, and that there was no duress,
fraud, undue influence, or lack of capacity of the parties. Id.
103. Id.
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determination of voluntariness may include anything else "the court
deems relevant.""1 4 The amendment, well-intentioned but cumbersome,
is an obvious attempt to emphasize the importance of independent
counsel for both parties while preserving the freedom of dispensing
with it if a party chooses to do so.
As a result of this statute, in California voluntariness now means
independent representation, or a knowing waiver of representation
and marital property rights." 5 While enhancing the position of the
challenging spouse, the new law imposes a heavy burden on counsel
for the represented party."0 6 In the performance of his duty to the
client, he is obligated to do everything necessary to insure the agree-
ment's enforceability."0 7 That means advising the other party to con-
sult independent counsel, getting a written waiver from a party who
persists in refusing independent counsel, explaining the terms and
effects of the agreement to the unrepresented party as well as the
rights and obligations she will give up by signing it, memorializing
the explanation, and identifying himself as the provider in writing for
signature by the unrepresented party before execution of the agree-
ment.' Why the legislature did not simply make representation by in-
dependent counsel a minimum requirement for voluntariness, as it did
for validity of support waivers in another amendment to California's
Premarital Agreement Act contained in the same bill, is unclear."° As
a guide to lawyers drafting premarital agreements and to courts pass-
ing on their validity, the utility of this list of statutory factors is di-
minished by the legislature's provision allowing consideration of "any
other factors the court deems relevant.""11 Such a clause leaves inter-
ested parties the task of divining and trying to plan for whatever those
other factors might be.'
104. Id.
105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (c) (Deering 2006). While the statute affords the chal-
lenging spouse much more information, there is no guarantee that she will be able to
"process" it. See Trebilcock & Elliott, supra note 5, at 62-64 (describing "information
failure" in family financial arrangements, sometimes where one party lacks the ability
to process information).
106. CAL FAM. CODE § 1615 (c).
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2004) (requiring lawyers to repre-
sent clients diligently).
108. Id.
109. S.B. 78,2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001). See infra note 531 and accompanying text.
110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(5).
111. The new law contains one other noteworthy change on the subject of financial dis-
closure. The new provision is described in the bill's summaries as having much more
impact than it really has: "this bill... [c]larifies that pre-marital agreements are not
enforceable... if the party against whom enforcement of the agreement is now sought
did not, prior to signing the agreement, receive a full, as well as fair and reasonable dis-
closure, of the property or financial obligations of the other party." 3rd Reading, S.B. 78,
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In two cases very similar to Bonds involving foreign nationals,
the supreme courts of Montana and North Dakota, applying their
respective versions of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, in-
validated agreements that the prospective wife had not voluntarily
entered. 112 In the Shirilla case from Montana, Steve and Natalia
struck up a romance via the internet; he went to Russia to meet her,
arranged for her fianc&e visa, and brought her and her son to the
United States."3 As the courtship progressed, he presented her with
a premarital agreement that kept the parties' property separate dur-
ing marriage and limited her rights to maintenance on divorce." 4 Ini-
tially, Natalia refused to sign it because of her limited comprehension
of English." 5 After trying unsuccessfully to get help from a foreign ex-
change student in translating the agreement, Steve hired a lawyer for
Natalia, but the lawyer did not speak Russian. "16 Although "the lawyer
expressed reservations about having Natalia sign the agreement,"
any advice he gave her "was without the benefit of a translator.""' 7
Shortly after the couple married, Steve fell and incurred a traumatic
head injury."' He returned home to find that his wife had moved out
and that his court-appointed guardian had bought her a new station
wagon and was paying her expenses." 9 Five months after the wed-
ding, Steve filed for divorce, and Natalia successfully challenged the
voluntariness of the agreement. 20 As the court explained her situ-
ation in rendering its decision, "Natalia gave up her life in Russia and
came to Montana to marry Steve."'' She "did not want to return to
Russia;" marriage was the only way to remain in the United States
legally, and Steve insisted on a premarital agreement.' 22 No one
2001-02 Reg. Sess. (July 17, 2001) (Cal.), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/
bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_78_cfa_20010718_222354_asmfloor.html. This sumary is an
overstatement of the bill's accomplishment. All the bill does is to add the word full to the
quantum of "fair and reasonable" financial disclosure, which, if provided before execution
of an unconscionable agreement, renders it valid. Under the plain language of the law,
an agreement's proponent in fact need not prove the challenger received financial dis-
closure if he can establish that she entered the agreement voluntarily.
112. In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1, 3-4 (Mont. 2004); Peters-Riemers v. Riemers,
2002 ND 72, 644 N.W.2d 197, 206-07.
113. Shirilla, 89 P.3d at 2.
114. If the marriage ended before Natalia got a permanent visa, husband agreed to
pay her transportation back to Russia and maintenance of $5,000. If it ended after two
years, maintenance went up to $7,500. Id. at 3.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 3-4.
118. Id. at2.
119. Shirilla, 89 P.3d at 2.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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translated it for her, and she signed it without understanding it. 23
The court thought these circumstances amounted to "coercive pres-
sure" that made the agreement involuntary and unenforceable.
124
In the North Dakota case, Peter-Riemers v. Riemers,25 Roland and
Jenese met in Belize while he was vacationing there.'26 He was mar-
ried but falsely told Jenese that he was divorcing his wife. 2 7 Jenese
was not a United States citizen, but "at Roland's invitation, [she] left
Belize and moved to North Dakota."'28 He set her up in an apartment
and divided his time among her, his wife and five children in another
town, and other women with whom he had extra-marital affairs.'29
After Jenese had Roland's child, Roland divorced his previous wife.
Three days before the marriage, he presented Jenese with a premari-
tal agreement prepared by his lawyer.'30 She was not represented by
counsel before or at execution of the agreement but instead read the
agreement in "the same room, at the same table, where Roland and
his attorney sat."'' The agreement eliminated the possibility of divis-
ible marital property on divorce but did not prohibit an award of ali-
mony. '32 Roland's financial disclosure in the agreement understated
his net worth by about fifty percent compared to information he had
given earlier on loan applications. 33 A month after execution of the
agreement, Roland sponsored Jenese's application for permanent
residence. 134 Only a year into the marriage, after Roland physically
abused her on several occasions, 135 Jenese filed for divorce. She chal-
lenged the premarital agreement as involuntary and unconsciona-
ble. 36 Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of North Dakota
agreed.137 The circumstances of execution created such a "coercive
123. Id.
124. Id. at 5. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's property division and main-
tenance award to the wife. She was allowed to keep the Subaru station wagon bought
for her by the husband's guardian, along with the property she brought to the marriage;
husband was ordered to pay the fees for her immigration attorney and maintenance of
$1,000 a month for twenty months. Id. at 5.
125. Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2002 ND 72, 644 N.W.2d 197.
126. Id. at 200.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 206.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. In the premarital agreement, Roland disclosed a net worth of $473,724, while
a few months earlier, he had represented on various loan applications net worths of
$1,341,500, $683,683, and $706,178. Id.
134. Id. at 200.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 206-07.
137. Id. at 207.
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environment" that Jenese's reading of the agreement was "cursory
and her understanding of its consequences limited.' 38 In addition,
Roland's financial disclosures did not meet the statutory standard
of fairness and reasonableness, and Jenese did not waive disclosure
or have notice of the "true state" of Roland's property or financial
obligations."3 9
2. Conflicting Cases in Montana and North Dakota
The Montana Supreme Court and the North Dakota Supreme
Court have each issued an inconsistent decision that must have been
wrongly decided if Shirilla and Peter-Riemers were correctly decided.
In the Wilkes case from Montana, 4 ' the parties to the premarital
agreement were Mary, a twenty-one-year old "developmentally dis-
abled" young woman, and Lawrence, a sixty-two-year old widower
in poor health.' The two had been living together in Lawrence's home
for four months before they married.' Lawrence "was retired and
received social security benefits as his only income; Mary was unem-
ployed and received social security disability benefits."'4 Two days
before their marriage, Lawrence brought Mary to his attorney's office,
where each received a copy of a premarital agreement the attorney
had prepared setting out the property of each without listing the
values of assets.'44 The agreement provided that each party was to
retain his or her separate property, whether acquired before or during
the marriage, free from any claim of the other.'45 Lawrence and Mary
signed and were married as planned.'46
After Lawrence died nearly two years later, Mary challenged the
validity of the agreement on the grounds that she was incapable of
understanding it when she signed it, the agreement was unconscio-
nable, and Lawrence had not provided adequate disclosure.'47 The
138. Id. at 206.
139. Id. at 207. The supreme court upheld the trial court's division of marital property
and its maintenance award: Roland was to transfer three parcels of realty to Jenese or
$180,000, pay maintenance of five hundred dollars a month for five years and Jenese's
attorney's fees of thirty thousand dollars. Id. at 210; Peters-Riemers, No. C-00-42, slip
op. at 4-8 (D. N.D. May 17, 2001).
140. Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, 27 P.3d 433 (Mont. 2001).
141. Id. at 434.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 435.
144. Id. at 434. He had realty, logging equipment, two cars, and a boat. She had personal
effects, a bed, and two dressers. Id. at 435.
145. Id.
146. Wilkes, 27 P.3d at 435.
147. Id. at 435-36.
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trial court found against her on all three points.14 It made its deter-
mination about Mary's capacity to enter the agreement on the basis
of lay testimony alone; no experts were called.'49 Chief among the wit-
nesses on this issue and the one on which the trial court most relied
was Lawrence's lawyer, who prepared the agreement and who testi-
fied that he explained it to Mary. 50 The court held that Mary did not
meet her burden of establishing her incompetence. 51 It also rejected
her position on substantive and procedural unconscionability.'52 On
this issue the trial court made two mistakes: it incorrectly described
the impact of the premarital agreement on Mary, and it ignored the
procedural defects in the bargaining process.5 3 The court erroneously
thought that Mary would share in any assets Lawrence acquired dur-
ing the marriage under the agreement,' thus misreading its plain
language, which provided that Mary would share nothing because
property whether "now owned or hereafter acquired" was to be free
from the claims of the other.'55 Additionally, the trial court viewed the
unconscionability issue as one of substance only, neglecting the pro-
cedural aspects of the case completely: the comparative ages and ex-
perience of Lawrence and Mary, her developmental disability, that
Lawrence took her to his lawyer two days before the wedding to sign
the premarital agreement that had not assigned values to Lawrence's
assets, and that she did not have independent legal representation.
56
148. Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, No. DV-99-61, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Mont. June 2, 2000).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5. "The Court has no doubt that Mary's reading comprehension is below the
norm, but she was not required to rely upon her own reading of the prenuptial agree-
ment as Mr. Evans reviewed it in detail." Id. The trial judge did not say that Mr. Evans
made any explanation to Mary of the rights she gave up by signing it, however. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Wilkes, No. DV-99-61, slip op. at 5.
154. It explained that "[tihe mere fact that Mary functions at a low intellectual level
does not make it less conscionable that she keeps what she brought into the marriage
and shares only whatever might have been added to Wilkes' premarital assets during the
course of marriage." Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 2 (reciting the language of the agreement).
156. The district court made still a third mistake about disclosure, equating the super-
ceded, less onerous standard of "fair" disclosure, with the current, more exacting standard
of "fair and reasonable" disclosure. Id. at 5. See MONT. CODEANN. § 72-2-224(2)(b)(i) (2005).
In two earlier cases, the court defined the old standard, In Re Estate of Thies v. Lowe,
903 P.2d 186, 190 (Mont. 1995) and Wiley v. Iverson, 985 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Mont. 1999). In
Wiley the court stated:
Fair disclosure contemplates that each spouse should be given information
of a general and approximate nature, concerning the net worth of the other.
Each party has a duty to consider and evaluate the information received
before signing an agreement since they are not assumed to have lost their
judgmental facilities because of their pending marriage.
Wiley, 985 P.2d at 1181. Presumably the new standard was tougher because it added
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In affirming the trial court's decision, the supreme court accepted
the trial court's erroneous assessment of the impact of the agreement
on Mary and also failed to deal with the procedural defects in the bar-
gaining process although they were patent and egregious. In a special
concurrence, two justices correctly described the impact of the agree-
ment on Mary and expressed dismay at the procedural defects in the
bargaining process, asserting that although the trial court's use of
"buzz words" ensured that the disclosure in the case cleared legal hur-
dles, the agreement's procurement certainly would not pass a "smell
test."' 7 The majority did not discuss the issue of Mary's ability to
enter the agreement understandingly. It saw no connection between
her capacity and the voluntariness of the agreement.'58 The court's
failure to connect capacity to voluntariness may account for its in-
consistent decision, three years later, in the Shirilla case, which pre-
sented remarkably similar facts to those in Wilkes. Mary in Wilkes
was developmentally disabled;" 9 Natalia in Shirilla did not under-
stand English." ° These factors affected each woman's ability to under-
stand the agreement she signed. At the time of execution, each was
already living with her prospective husband and was completely de-
pendent on him. Neither was represented by independent counsel,
and each signed the agreement in a coercive environment. In Shirilla,
the court attempted to distinguish Wilkes by claiming that neither of
the issues in Wilkes, "capacity and unconscionability," were impli-
cated in that case.'
6 '
Shirilla and Wilkes are in fact about the same issues: procedural
unconscionability and voluntariness. The ability of a party to under-
stand the language in which an agreement is written bears on the
issue of whether that party entered it voluntarily, as does the mental
"reasonable" to "fair" disclosure. Id. The trial judge in Wilkes, however, said that even
if the new standard was more onerous than the old, the disclosure here was adequate.
Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, No. DV-99-61, slip op. at 5 (D. Mont. June 2, 2000).
157. Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, 27 P.3d 433,438 (Mont. 2001) (Nelson, J., concurring).
As the concurrence explained:
I remain troubled that a 62-year old, sophisticated businessman can take his
21-year-old developmentally disabled, unsophisticated bride-to-be to his attor-
ney and, in summary fashion and without her being separately represented
by counsel, obtain her signature on a prenuptial agreement that effectively
divests her of all interest in his property upon his death.
Id. The concurrence was also troubled by the trial court's treatment of the disclosure
standard but acquiesced: "Even with [the trial court's] error, however, I do not disagree
that the court used enough of the right buzz-words and made sufficient findings to bring
this case within the law that actually applies." Id.
158. The majority stated that "[b]ecause voluntariness is not an issue, we need not
further analyze the agreement." Id. at 437.
159. Id. at 434.
160. In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P. 3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2004).
161. Shirilla, 89 P.3d at 4.
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capacity of a party. The court in Shirilla conceded as much, undercut-
ting its own assertion about capacity by quoting from the California
Bonds decision, which lays out the link between the two: "the party
seeking to avoid a premarital agreement may prevail by establish-
ing that the agreement was involuntary, and that evidence of lack
of capacity, duress, fraud, and undue influence... would be relevant
in establishing the involuntariness of the agreement." '162
Similarly in North Dakota, the state supreme court reached the
opposite result from Peters-Riemers in Binek v. Binek,'6' although the
cases had similar facts and implicated the same issues: voluntariness,
disclosure, and unconscionability. In Binek, the husband, Theodore,
presented the premarital agreement to his wife, Ruth, two days be-
fore the wedding by leaving it on a table to be discovered by her and
her sister.164 Theodore said that he would not marry if Ruth did not
sign it."'6 He was represented by counsel at signing, but she was not. 66
The parties divorced more than eighteen years later, when Ruth was
seventy-two years old and Theodore was eighty-one.'67 She challenged
the agreement, arguing that "she did not enter it voluntarily, it [was]
unconscionable," made without adequate disclosure, and it only ap-
plied to dissolution of the marriage by death of a spouse and not di-
vorce.'68 Since execution of the agreement, the couple's financial status
had deteriorated.'69 Theodore's net worth had fallen from about six
hundred thousand dollars to two hundred thousand dollars; his in-
come was fifteen thousand dollars a year, mostly from social security
benefits.17 ° Ruth's net worth had dropped from about thirty thousand
dollars to virtually nothing; her income was less than five thousand
dollars a year from social security.' 7 ' Without the three hundred dol-
lars a month she had been receiving in interim spousal support dur-
ing the divorce proceedings from Theodore, she would be forced to go
on welfare.'72
The state legislature enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act just a few days after the Bineks signed their agreement, and thus
the Act did not technically govern.'73 Nevertheless, the court applied
162. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 825-26 (Cal. 2001)) (emphasis
added).
163. 2004 ND 5, 673 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 2004).
164. Id. at 596.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 597.
168. Id. at 598.
169. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 598.
170. Id. at 596-97.
171. Id. at 597.
172. Id. at 597, 599.
173. Id. at 597.
2007] 367
368 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:349
relevant case law decided under the Act because common law require-
ments were analogous. 7 4 The trial court rejected Ruth's challenges to
the agreement, awarding Theodore all the couple's assets except for
the personalty in Ruth's possession and some receivables from her
children that she considered uncollectible."' 5 The court discontinued
any spousal support.'76 Both the district court and the Supreme Court
of North Dakota treated the premarital agreement as if it applied to
divorce despite its failure to mention divorce and its clear focus on
spousal death rights."' Downplaying the fact that Ruth had only two
days between presentation of the agreement and the wedding, and
that Theodore would not proceed with the wedding if she did not sign
it, the supreme court concluded that these circumstances did not de-
prive Ruth of an opportunity to consult legal counsel.'78 It also re-
jected her arguments that Theodore failed to make a full disclosure,
finding that what she knew at the time of signing the agreement was
sufficient. 79 However, she seemed to have known only one thing: that
he owned a coal mine.'" She testified that she guessed that he owned
his house; she was told by her family that he was worth over a million
dollars.' 8 ' She only later discovered during the divorce proceedings
that he had been worth six hundred thousand dollars at the time of
the agreement's execution.8 2
The court tested the agreement for substantive unconscionability
at execution and enforcement. 183 It found the agreement was not un-
conscionable at the time of execution because "it provided a means for
[wife] to keep her own assets and allow them to grow and [husband]
was obligated to support [wife] throughout the marriage."'84 This
justification is disingenuous because Ruth's assets at the time of the
marriage were only thirty thousand dollars, which were ultimately
174. Id. at 598.
175. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 597.
176. Id. at 601.
177. Id. at 600. By signing it, Ruth released
[All rights in the property or estate of [prospective husband] which she
might have by reason of their marriage, whether by way of dower, statutory
allowance, widow's allowance, intestate share, or election to take against his
will .... and with particular reference to Section 30.1-05-04, North Dakota
Century Code, as amended.
Id. The North Dakota statutory section provides for spousal elective shares. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-05-01 (2005). The supreme court read the language of the agreement as if
it ended with "by reason of their marriage," ignoring everything after it.
178. Binek v. Binek, 2004 ND 5, 673 N.W.2d 594, 599.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 596.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 598-600.
184. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 599-600.
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entirely consumed,185 and Theodore had the obligation to support
her during the marriage under North Dakota law regardless of any
agreement. 1s6
Despite the fact that enforcement of the agreement would require
Ruth to go on public assistance, the court found that it would not be
unconscionable to enforce it against her.'87 In its view, "[b]y not ad-
dressing spousal support and allowing Ruth Binek to keep her assets
separate from Theodore Binek's, the agreement created enough leeway
to avoid an unconscionable result based upon the parties' circum-
stances at the time of dissolution."'8 8 This reasoning too is disingen-
uous: by dissolution, Ruth's thirty thousand dollars in assets had not
appreciated but had instead been completely depleted, placing her in
the position of requiring public assistance to survive.
The court cited Peters-Riemers only for a procedural point,8 9
avoiding the difficulty of reconciling the two cases. By comparing
them one can observe that neither of the challenging wives had been
represented by counsel at execution of the agreement. In Peters-
Riemers the premarital agreement was presented three days be-
fore the wedding; 9 ° in Binek, two days. 9' In Peters-Riemers Roland
likely would have refused to marry without the agreement;'92 in Binek
Theodore stated that he would not marry without it.' 9 Also, neither
agreement contained a waiver of alimony or maintenance. Indeed,
the Binek agreement did not mention divorce and seemed to apply
only on death of a spouse.'94 Although Peters-Riemers' was a one year
marriage,'95 the Bineks' marriage endured for more than eighteen
years, during which Ruth was a homemaker.'96 Homemakers in long
term marriages are supposed to be prot6g6es of the law, not its vic-
tims.'97 As the Supreme Court of North Dakota reported Ruth Binek's
185. Id. at 597.
186. Indeed, the spouses owed each other mutual duties of support. See N.D. CENT.
CODE 14-07-03 (2006). Theodore complied with his duty by paying most of the living ex-
penses of the parties; Ruth complied with her duty by serving as a homemaker. Binek v.
Binek, 2004 ND 5, 673 N.W.2d 594, 597.
187. Binek, 673 N.W. 2d at 599-600.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 601.
190. Peters-Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2002 ND 72, 644 N.W.2d 197, 206.
191. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 596.
192. He "pressed" Jenese to sign it. Peters-Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2002 ND 72, 644
N.W.2d 197, 205-06 (N.D. 2002).
193. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 596.
194. Id.
195. Peters-Riemers, 644 N.W.2d at 201.
196. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 597.
197. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 767.56 (2006) (listing "length of the marriage" as the first
factor for a court to consider in determining support payments); see also In re Marriage
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own sentiments expressed in her testimony, "if the parties had gotten
divorced after one year, she would have abided by the agreement.""19
Nevertheless, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the Pieter-
Riemers agreement involuntary and invalid but upheld the Binek
agreement.199 As a result of the decisions, Jenese Peters-Riemers was
on her way to American citizenship, funded with a share of marital
property, as well as awards of alimony and attorneys' fees, °0 whereas
Ruth Binek was on her way to the welfare rolls, seemingly saddled
with the whole burden of the couple's financial decline.2 1 Perhaps
feeling a bit guilty after leaving a wife of such longstanding a public
charge, the supreme court remanded to the trial court for an expla-
nation of why it made no alimony award.0 2
3. Conflicting Cases in New Hampshire
New Hampshire similarly produced a puzzling pair of cases on
the voluntariness issue. New Hampshire courts presume that a pre-
marital agreement is valid "if three standards of fairness are met:
1) the agreement was not obtained through fraud, duress or mis-
take or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact;
2) the agreement is not unconscionable; or 3) the facts and circum-
stances have not changed since the agreement was executed so as
to make the agreement unenforceable. 2 3 In In re Yannalfo Gary
and Janice bought a home together a month before they married.2 4
The court noted that "[Gary] provided $70,000 as the down payment
and [Janice] contributed $5,000 toward closing costs."2 5 A day before
the wedding he presented her with a premarital agreement drafted
by his lawyer, providing that if the couple divorced, the house would
be sold and Gary would be entitled to the first seventy thousand
of LaRocque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 741-42 (Wis. 1987) ("Where a spouse has subordinated...
[her] career to devote time and energy to the welfare, career or education of the other
spouse or to managing the affairs of the marital partnership, maintenance may be used to
compensate this spouse for these nonmonetary contributions to the marriage.");
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 5.04 (referring to a "durational factor" in determining an award
of spousal support, which "should increase with the duration of the marriage", and
emphasizing other factors in such a determination, including loss in standard of living).
198. Binek v. Binek, 2004 ND 5, 673 N.W.2d 594, 598-99.
199. Peters-Riemers, 644 N.W.2d at 210; Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 600.
200. Peters-Riemers, 644 N.W.2d at 210.
201. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 600.
202. Id. at 601. The parties settled out of court, agreeing that Theodore would pay
Ruth a lump sum of $8,750. Binek v. Binek, No. 02C-215 (S.W. Dist. N.D. July 23, 2004)
(settlement order).
203. MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585, 589 (N.H. 1989).
204. 794 A.2d 795, 796 (N.H. 2002).
205. Id.
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dollars of equity.20 6 He told Janice that he would not marry her unless
she signed; accordingly she did so.2 °7 When the couple divorced after
twelve years and three children, Janice challenged the agreement
on the grounds that she had signed it under duress.2"8 She also al-
leged a legion of changed circumstances since execution which made
the agreement unenforceable against her. Gary had been fired from
his job for drug use... and remained unemployed or underemployed
during the marriage, requiring his wife to continue to work although
the couple had three children.210 Gary also dissipated the couple's
assets by taking unsuccessful legal action to get his job back and
making a speculative land investment that Janice opposed.21 Addi-
tionally her mother had given the couple thirty thousand dollars used
to make improvements to the house.2"2 Lastly, Gary's abusive behav-
ior caused Janice to obtain two restraining orders against him result-
ing in two criminal convictions.2"' The trial court agreed with Janice,
concluding that the circumstances surrounding execution of the agree-
ment did, indeed, show "a subtle form of duress,"2 4 in that presen-
tation of the agreement left no time for her to examine it or have it
reviewed by a lawyer of her choice.21 The court also found that cir-
cumstances had so changed since its execution that to enforce it would
be unfair.1 6
The supreme court disagreed.1 7 Neither the presentation of the
agreement one day before the wedding, nor the threat that the mar-
riage would not take place if Janice did not sign it, nor the fact that
she was unrepresented, was sufficient to support a finding of du-
ress.21 8 In addition, the court held that these facts were not sufficient
to permit a presumption that Janice had no time to consult an attor-
ney if she had decided to seek legal counsel.2 9 Incredibly, the supreme
court thought the changed circumstances cited by her, including
Gary's behavior and its consequences, were foreseeable at the time
206. Id. at 796, 799.
207. Id.
208. Id., 794 A.2d at 797; Brief of the Petitioner, In re Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H.
2002).
209. Brief of the Petitioner, supra note 208, at 14.
210. Yannalfo, 794 A.2d at 796.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 796-97.
214. Id. at 797.
215. Id. at 798.
216. Yannalfo, 794 A.2d at 798.
217. Id. at 799.
218. Id. at 798.
219. Id.
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of the agreement's execution and thus were not sufficient to make
its enforcement unfair.22 °
A year later the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found itself
faced with another voluntariness case, In re Estate of Hollett,221 and
reached an inconsistent result from that of Yannalfo. In Hollett, John
presented the antenuptial agreement two years before the wedding,
causing a "heated and unpleasant discussion during which Erin said
she would not sign [it] .,222 John presented it again less than forty-eight
hours before the wedding, saying that he would not go through with
the ceremony without it in effect.22 His lawyer contacted a recent law
school graduate, asked him to counsel Erin with respect to the pre-
marital agreement, and told him that John would pay the fee.224 Erin's
lawyer met with her and her mother the day before the wedding at
the offices of John's lawyers; she reportedly sobbed throughout the
meeting.22' Her lawyer had never negotiated a premarital agreement
before, but he studied up on the law and his negotiations on her be-
half produced a final agreement that was much more favorable to her
than the first draft presented.22 6 The couple signed the agreement on
the morning of the wedding.227
After eleven years of marriage, John died, and Erin challenged
the voluntariness of the agreement.228 John's first wife, to whom he
owed millions of dollars, and his five children with her argued that it
was valid.229 The trial court upheld its validity in a careful, painstak-
ing thirteen-page opinion, sorting through conflicts in the testimony,
and noting that Erin's personal assets had grown during the marriage
from ten thousand dollars to more than eight hundred thousand dol-
lars, even aside from her participation in husband's estate under the
premarital agreement.230
220. "In our view, these changes in circumstance are not so far beyond the contem-
plation of the parties when the agreement was executed that its 'enforcement would
work an unconscionable hardship."' Id. at 798-99. The dissent agreed with the majority
on this issue but thought the evidence adduced at trial could have supported a finding
of "duress." The dissenting justice doubted however that the trial court made such a finding
and would have remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 799 (Dalianis, J., dissenting).
221. 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003).
222. Id. at 350.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 354.
225. Id.
226. Under the original draft of the premarital agreement Erin gave up any claim to
alimony or property on divorce and would receive only twenty-five thousand dollars and
a car. Under the renegotiated agreement, she could get as much as one-sixth of John's
estate on his death or their divorce. Id. at 350-51.
227. Hollett, 834 A.2d at 351.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 349-51.
230. In re Estate of Hollett, No. 2001-0507, slip op. at 13 (Prob. Ct. N.H. May 1, 2002).
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The supreme court reversed, finding that the agreement was in-
voluntary and unenforceable." 1 Essentially it thought that it would
be "unreasonable" to find that Erin had enough time or opportunity
to utilize her lawyer's advice.232 It distinguished Yannalfo for the fol-
lowing unconvincing reasons: 1) the agreement in that case did not in-
volve an entire estate over six million dollars as in Hollett but rather
one asset, the seventy thousand dollar down payment on the house the
couple bought one month before they married; 2) the bargaining posi-
tions of the spouses in Hollett were more unequal than in Yannalfo;
233
and 3) the court thought John's conduct before the wedding in Hollett
differed from Gary's conduct in Yannalfo in that it raised questions
of his good faith in dealing with Erin because he waited to present
the premarital agreement for the second time just a few days before
the wedding.
234
That the voluntariness of an agreement should not depend on a
sliding scale of the assets at stake seems obvious, so the court's first
point of distinction rings hollow. The bargaining positions of the pro-
spective wives on the eves of their weddings were much alike: each
was presented with an unfavorable premarital agreement and an ulti-
matum from prospective husband that if she did not sign it he would
call off the wedding. John Hollett's conduct is arguably better, not
worse, than Gary Yannalfo's: John first raised the agreement two
years before the wedding and Erin might well have anticipated that
it would come up again. In addition, he found a lawyer for her who,
despite his inexperience and the time pressures, negotiated a more
favorable deal for her than the one originally drafted. If John's good
faith was questionable, so was Gary's. Gary presented the premari-
tal agreement for the first time a day before the wedding and a month
after the house to which it applied had been purchased. The New
Hampshire court did not mention that fact nor did it consider in its
disposition Gary Yannalfo's postmarital conduct, which was arguably
far worse than John Hollett's by any measure.
4. Three Conflicting Disclosure Cases From Georgia
Three Georgia premarital agreement cases deal with financial
disclosure but reach inconsistent results, making the state the fourth
jurisdiction to exhibit unreconciled conflicting cases. Georgia employs
231. In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 354 (N.H. 2003).
232. Id.
233. Erin was dependent on John. He had money; she had much less. She also had little
understanding of and no involvement in his business, whereas in Yannalfo both were
postal workers. Id.
234. Hollett, 834 A.2d at 352-53.
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the same three-pronged standard of review as New Hampshire, ex-
amining each premarital agreement for procedural and substantive
fairness at the time of execution of the agreement and giving each a
second look for substantive fairness at enforcement.235
In Alexander v. Alexander, the couple lived together before they
married.236 Four days before the wedding, Jerome presented Kimberly
with a premarital agreement.237 He told her "that he would not marry
unless she signed it and that his parents would not allow the mar-
riage without it. '2s3 No attorney reviewed it for her, perhaps because
Jerome told her such review was unnecessary."' By virtue of the
agreement, she waived rights to any property division and to alimony
as well.24 ° Although the agreement cited full disclosure by each in
Exhibits A and B "attached," no exhibits were attached.241 A year
after the marriage, the couple had a child, and Kimberly stayed home
to care for her.24 2 On divorce six years after the marriage, Kimberly
challenged the validity of the agreement.243 The trial court held it
invalid, finding that Jerome's ultimatum to Kimberly immediately
before the wedding induced her to sign the agreement "under consid-
erable duress. The wedding plans had been made; she had little time
to consult with an attorney... and, as she testified she felt that if she
did not sign the agreement [Jerome] would think that she did not love
and trust him.,244 The court also found that the agreement did not dis-
close material facts: no exhibits of assets were attached to it and no
evidence showed that either party had sufficient actual knowledge of
235. In Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 49 (Ga. 2005), the Georgia Supreme
Court phrased it this way:
... the trial judge should employ basically three criteria in determining
whether to enforce [an antenuptial] agreement in a particular case: (1) was
the agreement obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or through mis-
representation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) is the agreement uncon-
scionable? (3) [h]ave the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement
was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?
236. In Jerry's attorney's words: "The parties had known each other since June of 1996
and had lived together before the marriage." Brief of Appellant at 3, Alexander v.
Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48 (Ga. 2005). In Kimberly's attorney's words: "At the time of the
presentation of the.., agreement Appellee was very dependent upon Appellant.... At
the time of the signing of the .. .agreement Appellee was living and working with
Appellant and did not have any other place to live or any other source of income." Brief
of Appellee at 2, Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48 (Ga. 2005).
237. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d at 49.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d at 49.
244. Alexander v. Alexander, Civ. Act. No. 02-OV-310J, slip op. at 1, (Sup. Ct. Ga. July
29, 2003).
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the property owned by the other.245 As to the third prong of the test
for validity, the court found that the agreement did not contemplate
the birth of the parties' child, a significant change in circumstances
that made enforcement unfair and unreasonable.24 The Georgia
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to address each of the three
grounds if any one supported the trial court's decision.247 Therefore,
it affirmed the trial court on the disclosure ground alone, agreeing
that husband's ownership of an undisclosed forty thousand dollar in-
vestment account was a material fact without knowledge of which
wife could not intelligently enter into the agreement.24 Two justices
concurred in a separate opinion to emphasize their view that hus-
band's failure to disclose was the only ground for affirmance.249
A few months later, faced with a similar issue in Mallen v.
Mallen and a similarly unrepresented wife,25° the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the agreement against her.251 Like the Alexanders, the
Mallens had lived together before their marriage.252 During this time,
Catherine found herself pregnant.253 "While she was at a clinic to ter-
minate the pregnancy, [Peter] called to ask her not to go through with
the abortion and to marry him."'254 She agreed. A few days later, and
nine or ten days before the wedding, Peter presented her with the pre-
marital agreement, allegedly telling her that it was "just a formality
and he would always take care of her."'255 Peter sent her to a lawyer
who told her that he could not review the agreement for her in time.256
245. Id.
246. Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 49 (Ga. 2005).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 49-50.
249. Id. at 50 (Sears, J., concurring). The justices objected to the trial court's decision
on duress and change of circumstances. On the former, they said:
Duress which will avoid a contract must consist of threats of bodily or other
harm, or other means amounting to coercion, or tending to coerce the will of
another, and actually inducing him to do an act contrary to his free will....
The threats must be sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of
ordinary firmness.
Id. (Sears, J., concurring). The concurrence also disputed that the birth of a child could
constitute a material change in circumstances that would render the agreement unen-
forceable. Id. (Sears, J., concurring).
250. 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005).
251. Id. at 817.
252. Id. at 814.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. The lawyer recounted:
I remember [prospective wife] crying as we discussed the situation.... I told
her that, in my personal opinion, the actions of her fianc6 in this regard were
those of a cad.... I told her that, given the shortage of time and lack of in-
formation, I was unable to give her specific advice concerning the fairness
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She thereafter met with Peter and his lawyer more than once about
the agreement, apparently trying to negotiate on her own behalf.257
Peter agreed to increase a life insurance benefit and to modify the
limited alimony provisions (one thousand dollars a month for four
years) increasing the monthly amount by one hundred dollars for
each year of marriage, and Catherine ultimately signed the agree-
ment.25 Aside from this severely limited spousal support, the agree-
ment provided that all property was to be separate, belonging to the
party who owned it originally or received it during marriage.259 Al-
though the agreement disclosed Peter's assets (at least eight million
five hundred thousand dollars) it did not divulge his income of more
than five hundred sixty thousand dollars a year.260
When he sought a divorce after more than eighteen years of mar-
riage and four children, Catherine challenged the validity of the agree-
ment alleging duress, fraudulent representations, failure to disclose
material facts, unconscionability,261 and a significant change in cir-
cumstances since its execution that would make enforcement of the
agreement unfair, namely that husband's net worth had by the time
of the divorce grown by fourteen million dollars.262 The trial court re-
jected all of Catherine's claims without making any findings of fact or
conclusions of law; it merely entered an order upholding the agree-
ment.263 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court and
its award to Catherine under the agreement of only two thousand
nine hundred dollars a month in alimony for only four years.2" Peter
received all the assets with which he entered the marriage and all the
assets accumulated during it. 265 For its decision on the issue of du-
ress, the supreme court adopted a new definition and applied it arbi-
trarily to Catherine.266 Phrased negatively, "insistence on a prenuptial
of the Prenuptial Agreement.
AfM. Tom Pye at 2-3, Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (2005).
257. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d at 814.
258. Id. at 814, 818.
259. Id. at 814.
260. Id. at 816, 818.
261. Id. at 814, 816.
262. Id. at 817.
263. Mallen v. Mallen, No. 2003CV73595 (Sup. Ct. Ga. April 12, 2004) (order enforcing
premarital agreement).
264. Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 814, 817 (Ga. 2005).
265. Id.
266. The court accepted the definition of duress laid out by the concurring justices in
Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 50 (Ga. 2005) (Sears, J., concurring). The court
explained:
Nothing in the record of this case suggests that wife's free will was overcome
by the "threat" of not going through with the wedding. In fact, wife exercised
her free will and declined to sign the agreement in the form it was presented
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agreement as a condition of marriage" was not duress sufficient to
invalidate the agreement.267
On the disclosure issue, the court took another questionable
position, holding that Peter did not have to disclose his income be-
cause no confidential relationship exists between parties about to
marry in Georgia.268 Instead Catherine had a duty to make inquiries
to ascertain the full nature and extent of Peter's resources.269 She lived
with him before the marriage and "was aware from the standard of
living they enjoyed that he received significant income from his busi-
ness and other sources. 270 In contrast Kimberly Alexander lived with
Jerome before their marriage, yet his failure to disclose a forty thou-
sand dollar IRA was sufficient to invalidate their premarital agree-
ment.271 Curiously the court made no attempt to distinguish Alexander.
By imposing a duty on the wife to investigate husband's financial re-
sources, the court effectively negated that part of the Georgia test
that makes failure to disclose a material fact a ground for invalidat-
ing a premarital agreement. Three justices dissented from the major-
ity.2 72 They would have held, correctly, that parties entering a pre-
marital agreement have a duty to disclose material facts, even in the
absence of a confidential relationship. 27" They saw clearly that in a
case like this one in which the premarital agreement severely lim-
ited alimony, the husband's income was a material fact that he has
the obligation to disclose.274
to her, acquiescing only when changes were made improving her position in
the event of divorce or husband's death. The fact of wife's pregnancy does
not make husband's insistence on the agreement rise to the level of duress.
She had already demonstrated her willingness to terminate the pregnancy
so she cannot credibly claim the pregnancy put such pressure on her as to
overcome her will.
Mallen, 622 S.E.2d at 816. For more examples of courts applying new standards to the
instant litigants before them, see infra notes 528-32 and accompanying text (discussing
the Pendleton case from California where the court changed its stance on the enforceability
of alimony waivers), notes 582-604 and accompanying text (discussing DeMatteo case
from Massachusetts where court imposed new substantive fairness standard), and notes
646-74 and accompanying text (discussing Hardee case from South Carolina where court
enforced alimony waiver against wife).
267. Id. at 815.
268. Id. at 816.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 50 (Ga. 2005). The IRA was an asset that,
according to Jerry's attorney, was acquired before the marriage and never liquidated and
to which the premarital agreement did not apply. The only asset at issue in the divorce
case was a residence to which, again according to Jerry's attorney, the premarital agree-
ment "is crucial," and about which "Ms. Alexander had adequate knowledge." Brief of
Appellant at 5, Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48 (Ga. 2005).
272. Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 817-18 (Ga. 2005) (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 818.
274. Id.
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The disclosure issue arose again in a recent Georgia case, Corbett
v. Corbett."5 Charles and Eileen married in 1987, signing a premar-
ital agreement three days before the wedding." 6 It precluded the ac-
quisition of marital assets, kept the spouses' property separate, and
waived alimony."' The agreement contained an acknowledgment that
"they each had read it and had it explained to them by specifically
identified independent counsel of their own choosing. [It] also pur-
ported to make full disclosure of the ... assets of [each spouse]."278
When Ellen sought a divorce after fifteen years of marriage, Charles
asserted the agreement. 9 The trial court refused to enforce it, hold-
ing that it violated all three prongs of the Georgia test, most impor-
tantly, that it failed to disclose Charles's income and Ellen waived
alimony.2" The supreme court said that regardless of what the agree-
ment recited, "the evidence uncontrovertedly established that Wife
had not read the agreement prior to signing it, she did not have an
attorney review or explain [it] ... she had no knowledge, independ-
ent or otherwise, as to the amount of Husband's income." '281 The only
point the court discussed was the disclosure issue, holding that the
trial court was correct in its conclusion that the husband's failure to
disclose his income invalidated the agreement.282 Attempting to dis-
tinguish the cases, the court cited Alexander and Mallen, saying
We find nothing in the parties' standard of living before the mar-
riage which would have put Wife on notice that Husband failed
to disclose material facts so as to render the nondisclosure im-
material. Compare [Alexander] (nondisclosure of $40,000 invest-
ment account rendered antenuptial agreement unenforceable)
with [Mallen] (wife deemed to be aware of husband's 'significant
income' from high standard of living before marriage).
283
This analysis is not a satisfactory reconciliation of the cases. The
undisclosed asset in Alexander was a small investment account con-
sisting of Jerome's separate property that Kimberly would not have
shared on divorce had no premarital agreement existed.2' Thus, the
undisclosed asset was not material to the voluntariness of her entry
275. 628 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 2006).
276. Id. at 585.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 586.
281. Corbett, 628 S.E.2d at 585.
282. Id. at 586.
283. Id.
284. See Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 49 (Ga. 2005) (noting "that prior to
marriage, Mr. Alexander owned an investment account worth approximately $40,000").
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into the premarital agreement. The undisclosed asset in Mallen was
Peter's substantial income, which would have been the basis for an
alimony award after their eighteen-year marriage had no agreement
existed. This income was certainly material to the voluntariness of
her entry into the premarital agreement. Indeed, the court recognized
this proposition in the facts of Corbett.
5. Disclosure in Pennsylvania
In 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced in Simeone
v. Simeone that it would no longer review premarital agreements for
substantive fairness at either execution or enforcement but look only
for procedural defects in procurement.8 5 Pennsylvania applies the
same principles to postmarital agreements.286 It enforces both types
of agreements unless they are void on common law grounds, such as
fraud, or if a party fails to make "full and fair" disclosure of his own
assets before entering the agreement.287 Since Simeone, the supreme
court has decided only two cases dealing with the disclosure require-
ment, one arising from a premarital agreement, the other from a post-
marital agreement.2 8
The court described the couple in Porreco v. Porreco, as: "Louis,
forty-five years old and previously married when he met [Susan] when
she was seventeen years old, in high school, living with her parents
and working at a ski shop."289 The two dated for more than two years,
during which time Susan quarreled with her parents about the re-
lationship, prompting Susan to move out of her family home.9 ° The
court noted that"Louis provided [her] with an apartment, an automo-
bile, insurance, a weekly allowance, access to one of his credit cards
as a secondary cardholder, and a gas charge account at his car dealer-
ship's fueling station."29' Louis also gave Susan an engagement ring,
telling her the gem it contained was a diamond even though he knew
it was merely a cubic zirconium.292 Before their marriage Louis pre-
sented Susan with a premarital agreement, providing that on divorce
she would receive a lump sum of three thousand five hundred dollars
for each year of marriage instead of alimony.293 Under the agreement,
Louis was to "provide her with an automobile and health insurance
285. 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
286. In re Estate of Ratony, 277 A.2d 791, 793 (Pa. 1971).
287. Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 570 (Pa. 2002).
288. Id. at 567.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 568.
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for one year."294 The parties would retain their separate property,
including appreciation in its value. An attorney, a tenant in Louis's
guest house,295 reviewed the agreement for Susan but conducted no
negotiations on her behalf.2" Susan testified that she understood what
she would receive under the agreement at divorce. 297 Before the par-
ties signed it, Louis prepared a handwritten statement of Susan's
assets listing the engagement ring at a value of twenty-one thousand
dollars. In fact it was "worthless.""29 The final typed version of assets
listed hers at over forty-six thousand dollars, almost half of which was
attributable to the ring, and his near $3.3 million.299
When the parties separated more than ten years later, Susan
took the engagement ring to a jeweler only to discover that it did not
contain a diamond. She sought to set the premarital agreement aside
on three grounds: "(1) that Louis fraudulently induced her to marry
him by misrepresenting the value of the ring; (2) that Louis breached
a confidential relationship with her, and (3) that Louis violated his
duty.., of a full and fair disclosure" required under the Pennsylvania
standard by not disclosing the true value of her engagement ring.3 °°
The trial court agreed that Louis and Susan were in a confidential
relationship, treating it as a question of fact rather than law.01 To
support this conclusion the court cited the difference in the parties'
ages, sophistication, wealth and status, and Susan's dependence on
Louis for material and social well-being. °2 It found that Louis vio-
lated the relationship by having his lawyer draft such a one-sided
premarital agreement. °3 It also held that Louis misrepresented the
value of the engagement ring to induce Susan to sign the agreement
and that she signed it in material reliance on the misrepresentation.3°
The trial court believed her testimony that if she had known Louis
had given her a "fake" ring and lied about it, she would not have
married him.3°5 In invalidating the agreement the trial court did not
294. Id.
295. Susan had trouble finding a lawyer. Her uncle, a partner in a law firm, was her
original choice but her father asked her not to "drag her family into the situation." Porreco
v. Porreco, 82 ERIE COUNTY LEGAL J. 35, 41 (reprinting trial court opinion). She then
tried a mutual friend of the parties who declined. Id. The attorney who finally agreed to
represent her lived in the guest house on the husband's property. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 46.
299. Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 568 (Pa. 2002).
300. Id. at 569.
301. Porreco v. Porreco, 82 ERIE CouNTYLEGALJ. 35,45 (reprinting trial court opinion).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 45-46.
304. Id. at 46.
305. Id.
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reach the disclosure issue.3"6 The superior court affirmed in a two-to-
one decision; the majority agreed that Louis had fraudulently mis-
represented the value of the ring, but it did not address the issue of
breach of confidential relationship. °7 Interestingly, the dissenting
justice thought the remedy of invalidating the agreement too harsh
and would have required Louis to pay Susan twenty-one thousand
dollars for the represented value of the ring, otherwise enforcing the
agreement.0 8
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, while purporting to be
bound by the trial court's factual conclusions, found that Susan's re-
liance on the value of the ring listed on the asset schedule was not
justifiable."° According to the majority, she should have conducted
her own investigation of the ring's value.' 0 It explained that since
Simeone, Pennsylvania has moved toward treating prospective
spouses the "same as parties to other contracts" with the "duties of
investigation and due care for their bargain." '311 Because Susan had
the ring in her possession, she should have done at the outset what
she did when she and Louis separated: gone out and gotten an ap-
praisal.312 Thus, the supreme court reversed the superior court's de-
cision on the misrepresentation issue but remanded the case to review
whether the parties were in a confidential relationship. 313 Three
judges dissented from the majority, one in rhyme. 314 Agreeing with
the trial court, the dissenting judges thought that in view of the dis-
parities between the parties in age and sophistication, Susan's reli-
ance on Louis's misrepresentation was justified."' Two judges wrote
separate concurrences to object to the rhyming dissent316 and a third
306. Id. at 47.
307. Porreco v. Porreco, No. 1502 WDA 1999 (Pa. Super., June 6, 2000).
308. Id. at 15 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
309. Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 571-72 (Pa. 2002).
310. Id. at 572.
311. Id. at 571.
312. Id. at 572.
313. Id.
314.
She was 19, he was nearly 30 years older;
was it unreasonable for her to believe what he told her?
Given their history and Pygmalion relation,
I find her reliance was with justification.
Given his accomplishment and given her youth,
was it unjustifiable for her to think he told the truth?
Or for every prenuptial, is it now a must
that you treat your betrothed with presumptive mistrust?
Id. at 576 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 575-76.
316. See, e.g., id. at 572 (Zappala, C.J., concurring) ("I write separately to address my
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to point out that none of the courts had yet ruled on the issue of dis-
closure.317 On remand, the superior court found that no confidential
relationship existed because Susan had consulted a lawyer, 18 but it
neglected to mention that he did not negotiate for her and that he
was Louis's tenant. In turn, that court remanded the case to the trial
court for a determination of the disclosure issue.31 ' There the case
languishes.
In Stoner v. Stoner, the parties, neither of whom was represented
by counsel, were already divorcing when they executed the agree-
ment. ° Thus, their agreement is technically a separation agreement
and would otherwise fall outside the scope of this article."' However,
the supreme court in Stoner did not distinguish it in any significant
way either from premarital agreements or other postmarital agree-
ments, calling it a "postnuptial" agreement and citing Simeone for
the proposition that premarital and postnuptial agreements are to
be treated alike.322 Therefore, Stoner, valuable for what it says about
disclosure obligations in Pennsylvania, is properly included in this
discussion.
The agreement in Stoner acknowledged that Danny had paid
Mary six thousand dollars and that the payment was his sole obli-
gation to her on dissolution of the marriage.323 She agreed to sign all
divorce papers and to sign off on his retirement accounts.2 Mary
challenged the agreement in divorce proceedings on the ground that
it did not satisfy the Simeone disclosure requirement because Danny
did not disclose the statutory rights that she was relinquishing by
signing. 25 Danny argued that if Mary was correct, no marital agree-
ment could ever be valid unless the parties were represented by
counsel. 32" The trial court agreed with Danny, but the superior court
grave concern that the filing of an opinion that expresses itself in rhyme reflects poorly
on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.").
317. See id. at 573-74 (Castille, J., concurring).
318. Porreco v. Porreco, No. 1502 WDA 1999 at 4 (Pa. Super., June 6, 2000).
319. Id.
320. 819 A.2d 529, 530 (Pa. 2003).
321. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 6 (defining the scope of this article to exclude sepa-
ration agreements).
322. Stoner, 819 A.2d at 533 n.5. In an earlier decision the supreme court distinguished
between two kinds of postnuptial agreements: a separation agreement that would be abro-
gated by the parties' reconciliation and a postnuptial settlement agreement that would
not. Vaccarello v. Vaccarello, 757 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 2000). Finding the agreement in
question to be the latter, it remanded to the superior court for a determination of whether
the husband made full and fair disclosure of the marital assets. Id. at 915.
323. Stoner, 819 A.2d at 530.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 531, 533.
326. Id. at 532.
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reversed.327 The majority held that even though Mary had received a
full and fair disclosure of marital assets, she had not been apprised
of the rights she forfeited by signing. 28 The court said that the agree-
ment should have mentioned everything: equitable distribution, ali-
mony, and alimony pendente lite.329 The supreme court agreed with
the dissent in the superior court and accordingly reversed, declining
to impose advice of statutory rights as part of the Pennsylvania dis-
closure requirement.3"' To do so, it thought, would "contravene the
guiding principles of Simeone," and "resurrect the paternalistic ap-
proaches to evaluating marital contracts" that assume wife 'lacks the
intelligence or ability to protect her own rights."3 ''
6. Disclosure and Representation in Connecticut
The Connecticut legislature considered but rejected the promul-
gated version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act. It instead
passed its own unique scheme for testing the validity of premarital
agreements in 1995.332 Connecticut provides five independent grounds
for challenging a premarital agreement. Successful proof of any one
of the following will invalidate the agreement: 1) that the party did
not enter the agreement voluntarily,"33 2) that the agreement was
unconscionable when executed,334 3) that the agreement was uncon-
scionable at the time of enforcement,3 5 4) that the challenger did not
receive "a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and
value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party"
before execution of the agreement,3 6 or 5) that the challenger did not
have "a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent coun-
sel.33 7 In Friezo v. Friezo, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled on
two of these grounds, the disclosure requirement and the requirement
that the challenger receive a reasonable opportunity to consult with
independent counsel.3
Victoria and David began their relationship in 1994 when
Victoria went to work as a trader's assistant and personal aide for
327. Id. at 530-31.
328. Id. at 531.
329. Stoner, 819 A.2d at 531.
330. Id. at 533.
331. Id.
332. Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36a (2004).
333. Id. § 46b-36g (a)(1).
334. Id. § 46b-36g (a)(2).
335. Id.
336. Id. § 46b-36g (a)(3).
337. Id. § 46b-36g (a)(4).
338. Friezo v. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897 (Conn. Feb. 6, 2007).
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Bankers Trust in London, England.19 She was a British citizen with
a high school education, working under David's direction. 4° David was
a college graduate with an impressive, established career in finance. 1
The two began dating and Victoria left her mother's house to live with
David in his Mayfair apartment. 342 Aside from the rent, which David
paid, the two maintained their finances separately. 1 3 He did not pro-
vide Victoria with a credit card or bank account, and she paid her own
expenses.3 44 The parties did not talk about David's finances. 345 The
relationship continued for three years during which the parties trav-
eled together and Victoria continued to work at Bankers Trust, serv-
ing as personal assistant to David at work and at home.346
In the summer of 1997, [David] asked [Victoria] to go to the United
States to oversee renovations and furnishing of the Westport
house. The plaintiff... readily agreed to his request... [and]
took an unpaid leave of absence from the Bankers Trust job. In
October, 1997, the plaintiff received notice that her employment
at Bankers Trust was terminated because of the extraordinary
length of her leave of absence. She continued to look after the ren-
ovations at the Westport house. Because her tourist visa allowed
her to stay in the United States only ninety days at a time, the
plaintiff traveled home to London every three months for a stay
of a week before returning to Westport .... As in London, the
plaintiff provided all the domestic services and ran personal
errands for the defendant. The defendant paid the mortgage and
utility expenses at the Westport house. The plaintiff used her
savings to pay all her other living expenses .... 347
In August of 1998, Victoria discovered that she could no longer
enter the United States on a tourist visa. 48 She and David consulted
an immigration lawyer who apparently advised that if Victoria mar-
ried an American citizen by the end of November 1998, she could stay
in the United States.49 David proposed marriage on August 20, 1998
and shortly thereafter told Victoria that she would have to sign a
339. Id. at *1.
340. Id.
341. Id. at *1-2, *3 n.14.
342. Id. at *1.
343. Id.
344. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *1.
345. Id. at *1 & n.4.
346. Id. at *1-2.
347. Id. at *2 (quoting the trial court in Friezo v. Friezo, No. FA020190070, 2004 WL
2165045, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2004)).
348. Id.
349. Id.
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premarital agreement."' 0 Victoria was not "familiar" with such agree-
ments but was willing to sign if that was what David wanted."'
They planned the wedding for Friday, November 6, 1998.352
David did not mention the agreement again until November 2, when
he said the wedding would have to be postponed because the agree-
ment was not ready.353 The parties never discussed possible terms,
and Victoria set a new wedding date of November 13. 3 ' David gave
Victoria a copy of the agreement at his apartment on November 5; it
contained nineteen articles but no disclosure of assets or income. 55
He told her to 'look it over and get it signed." '356 David also told
Victoria that his sister-in-law, Kristen Friezo, could recommend an
attorney with whom Victoria might wish to consult. 57
After reading the agreement and making notes on it, Victoria
went to see Kristin Friezo, an attorney, who introduced Victoria to
another lawyer in her firm, Eamonn F. Foley.358 Foley's first act was
to ask Victoria to sign a conflict of interest waiver, which she did. 59
The two met for half an hour. Foley already had a draft of the agree-
ment, as well as a statement of David's assets and liabilities.3 ° David
had sent these to Foley the day before David presented the draft to
Victoria. Foley didn't discuss David's assets with Victoria, nor did he
explain any parts of the draft agreement that she didn't raise herself.
Foley did not ask whether Victoria understood the draft. This was
Foley's only meeting with Victoria though they may have had a later
conversation before she signed the agreement. 36' Foley faxed his notes
about Victoria's comments on the agreement to David's attorney, but
Victoria never had an opportunity to speak to David about the agree-
ment because he was out of the country. 362 Twenty-four hours before
the wedding, the parties met in the offices of David's lawyer and
signed the agreement.36 3 By then it contained the disclosures of fi-
nancial information that it had lacked before, and Victoria saw a state-
ment of David's assets, liabilities, and income for the first time.
350. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *2.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *2.
357. Id. at *3.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at *4.
362. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *4.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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These disclosures showed David's net worth as approximately $6.5
million and his income for 1997, excluding capital gains, as $2.3 mil-
lion.3 65 Victoria had filled in her schedule earlier, showing total as-
sets of twenty-two thousand dollars.366 Foley was not present at the
signing and did not charge Victoria for his services, although David
"directed" Victoria "to send Foley two bottles of wine as a gesture
of gratitude," which she did.367 David paid his lawyer over five thou-
sand dollars.36
The parties married on November 13, had a son, and ultimately,
in June 2002, Victoria sought a divorce.36 By this time David's assets
had grown to $22.7 million,17' and Victoria, who had not worked out-
side the home after losing her Bankers Trust job, had assets consist-
ing of "bank accounts totaling $26,063, security deposits with her
landlords of $11,800, and assorted furnishings and jewelry. 37' In re-
sponse to Victoria's challenge, the trial court invalidated the premari-
tal agreement on two grounds: David failed to make the required fi-
nancial disclosures, and Victoria did not have a reasonable opportu-
nity to consult with independent counsel. Specifically, the trial court
found that Victoria did not have time to examine the agreement once
the financial information was included and did not have actual knowl-
edge of the defendant's income or his assets.37 It also concluded that
Foley did not represent Victoria's interests or give her adequate help
in understanding the agreement.173 Indeed, it found that Victoria, in-
experienced with lawyers, "did not know that she was being set up"
[presumably by David, his sister-in-law, and Foley].a7 It accordingly
awarded her $10.5 million as a property settlement to be paid over
seven years and alimony of fifteen thousand dollars a month until pay-
ment of the first installment of the property award, when Victoria's
alimony would be reduced to ten thousand dollars monthly."5 Under
the premarital agreement she would have received only four hun-
dred thousand dollars, plus use of a residence for herself and the
parties' child.
3 76
365. Id. at *10.
366. Id. at *3.
367. Id. at *4.
368. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *5 n.18.
369. Id. at *4.
370. Friezo v. Friezo, No. FA020190070, 2004 WL 2165045, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Aug. 27, 2004).
371. Id.
372. Id. at *4.
373. Id. ("Foley was either incredibly incompetent in his representation of the plaintiff
or he was not, in fact, representing her at all.")
374. Id.
375. Id. Orders, 25, 42.
376. See Friezo v. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *18 & n.1 (Conn. Feb. 6, 2007) (Norcott,
J., dissenting).
LOVERS' CONTRACTS IN THE COURTS
On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court, over Justice Norcott's
dissent,377 did three extraordinary things. First, it gave no deference
to the trial court's findings of fact, engaging instead in a complete de
novo review even though review for clear error was the appropriate
standard.378 Second, after conceding that parties to a premarital agree-
ment in Connecticut are "in a confidential relationship of mutual
trust that demands the exercise of the highest degree of good faith,
candor and sincerity in all matters bearing on the proposed agree-
ment,'3 79 it nevertheless held that Victoria's lack of financial experi-
ence was not relevant to whether David made a fair and reasonable
disclosure of his financial circumstances. 3" It further held that Foley's
knowledge of David's finances must be imputed to Victoria, despite
the facts that Foley never communicated this information to her, that
his performance in representing her was substandard at best, and
that he was connected through Kristen Friezo to David.3"' To shore
up this decision, it attributed to Victoria "excellent judgment in con-
ducting her personal financial affairs" '382 because "[hier total net worth
was $22,000 at the time of the marriage. It is therefore clear that the
plaintiff knew how to save, invest and manage her own money. 383
The court failed to note that David's net worth at the same time was
a little more than $6.5 million and that Victoria's conduct of her per-
sonal financial affairs caused her to lose her job with Bankers Trust,
and, thus unemployed, to become financially dependent on her own
small savings and David. Third, the court closed its eyes to the con-
nection between David and Foley, the timing of David's suggestion
that Victoria consult his sister-in-law, and Foley's incompetent perfor-
mance as Victoria's lawyer. Foley's main interest at his only meeting
with Victoria seemed to be securing, without explanation, Victoria's
waiver of his clear conflict of interest.3" As if to add insult to injury,
the supreme court suggested that Victoria could have brought a
377. Id.
378. As Justice Norcott said in his dissent: "I disagree with the majority's conclusion
that this appeal is subject to plenary review .... Rather, my review of the text and struc-
ture of the statute itself indicates that the trial court's conclusions [on disclosure and
representation] were factual findings subject to review only for clear error." Id. at *19; see
also Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 49 (2005); In Re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d
815, 836 (2000).
379. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *9 (majority opinion).
380. Id. at *10.
381. Id. at *12. For this conclusion the court relied on Dornemann v. Dornemann, 859
A.2d 273 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004). In that case, the plaintiffs attorneys were unconnected
to the husband, their independence was not under attack, and they had communicated the
husband's financial information to the plaintiff. Id. at 505.
382. Friezo, 2007 WL 268897, at *15.
383. Id.
384. Id. at *3.
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malpractice action against Foley on the grounds of his incompetence
but that she "did not do so."'' The supreme court's refusal to protect
Victoria in these circumstances is an unjustifiable dilution of the
Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act.
7. Maine
In Hoag v. Dick,"'6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed
a lower court decision that had held a premarital agreement invalid
because the prospective wife did not enter it voluntarily and "intel-
ligently" and because the substance of the agreement was unfair.387
As the parties executed the agreement a few months before Maine
enacted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, the court applied the
common law.3"' The parties' first marriage lasted four years.8 9 How-
ever, they continued to live together after their divorce until Terry's
church threatened her with excommunication unless she remarried
or stopped living with Richard, her ex-husband.3" The parties decided
to remarry and discussed premarital agreements with Richard's son,
an attorney.391 Although he suggested that each party be represented
by independent legal counsel, Terry remarked that it should not be
necessary because she "did not want anything." '392 Richard would not
remarry without an agreement; his son prepared it and delivered it
to Terry on the day of the wedding.393 In fact, she signed it before a
notary in the parking lot of the church just before the ceremony. 94
The agreement gave her a six-thousand-dollar lump sum on divorce
even though Richard had assets in excess of one million dollars.9 '
On the parties' second divorce ten years later, Terry raised is-
sues of involuntariness and unconscionability.396 The trial court noted
that Terry was not represented by independent counsel, did not know
the legal impact of the agreement, and had no opportunity to learn
of its implications.397 The court refused to enforce the agreement,
concluding that Terry could not have "intelligently entered into the
385. Id. at *12.
386. 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002).
387. Id. at 395; Dick v. Dick, No. AUG-FM-98-26, slip op. at 5 (D. Ct. Me. Dec. 7, 1998).
388. Hoag, 799 A.2d at 392-94.
389. Id. at 392.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Hoag, 799 A.2d at 392.
395. Id.
396. See Dick v. Dick, No. AUG-FM-98-26, slip. op. at 5 (D. Ct. Me. Dec. 7, 1998).
397. Id.
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[agreement].""39 It said further that the substance of the agreement,
under which plaintiff received only six thousand dollars and was
responsible for her own and her husband's legal fees if she began a
divorce proceeding, was "beyond unfair and unreasonable." '399 The
supreme court obscured the exact grounds of its affirmance; after lay-
ing out the troublesome substantive provisions of the agreement, it
shifted to the procedural aspects of the case, ultimately saying, "[t]he
[trial] court's factual findings regarding the circumstances of exe-
cution support its conclusion that the premarital agreement is un-
enforceable."4 0'
8. Kansas
In Davis v. Miller, Steven filed for divorce after a twenty-seven
year marriage with Charline.401 Nine months later, the parties, each
represented by counsel, executed a postmarital agreement and recon-
ciled.4"2 The reconciliation lasted a year, after which Steven again filed
for divorce.40 3 The divorce order incorporated the postmarital agree-
ment, which provided that its validity should be governed under the
Kansas Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.40 4 In a separate action,
Charline challenged the agreement, alleging fraud and breach of war-
ranty.0 5 She claimed that Steven valued his company at book value
rather than fair market value.4" Documents that turned up in discov-
ery during the divorce showed the company's fair market value to be
about twice book value or approximately three million dollars.40 7
The trial court granted summary judgment against Charline.408
In the Supreme Court of Kansas, Charline argued first that although
the parties had agreed to be bound by the Uniform Act, it should not
govern.40 9 Stating its view that parties entering a postnuptial agree-
ment were in a "vastly different position" from those executing a
398. Id.
399. Id. The ultimate divorce judgment gave Terry $150,600 as her share of marital
property, spousal support of six hundred dollars a month for at least five years (until
October 31, 2006), nominal support of one dollar a year thereafter, and attorneys' fees
of about $17,500. Id. at 11, 12.
400. Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391, 395 (Me. 2002).
401. 7 P.3d 1223, 1226 (Kan. 2000).
402. Id. at 1227, 1229.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 1229.
405. Id. at 1227.
406. Id. at 1228.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1226.
409. Id. at 1229. She knew she would not be able to get the agreement struck down if
the Uniform Act applied, because under the Act disclosure is only an issue where the agree-
ment is unconscionable, and here clearly it was not. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-807 (2005).
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premarital agreement, and that the "dynamics and pressures" in-
volved in each were "qualitatively different," the supreme court held
nevertheless that parties could choose to have their agreementjudged
under an otherwise inappropriate standard.41 °
Charline next argued that Steven failed to fully disclose his
assets, claiming that she would not have signed the agreement if she
had known his company's fair market value was so much greater
than its book value. 41' The court noted that during the negotiations
Charline had independent counsel and was advised as well by an
accountant.4 2 She and her advisors chose not to make an independ-
ent valuation of Steven's company because they deemed it too ex-
pensive.4"3 Furthermore, she was a stockholder in the company with
access to financial information if she asked for it.4 14 "[M]oreover," the
court noted that, "due to the lengthy marriage, [Charlinel was in a
position of knowledge that is far superior to that of a young bride
signing the agreement before the marriage. 41 5 The agreement gave
her substantial assets: she "was able to keep the family home, the
power motor boat, $100,000 in cash, and a promissory note worth over
one million dollars."4 '6 According to the court, this was enough "[t]o
continue a lifestyle ... she led when married. .. ,,4" Applying the
Act, the Supreme Court of Kansas found that Charline had entered
the agreement voluntarily, the agreement was not unconscionable,
and Steven fairly and reasonably disclosed his property to her.41 8
9. Allegations of Promises Not Included in the Premarital
Agreement: North Dakota and Maryland
In re Estate of Lutz was triggered by the death of Emanuel after
a six-and-a-half year marriage.419 The North Dakota Supreme Court
decision was the last act in a litigation that began in 1995, went to the
state's highest court three times over various procedural disputes,420
and ultimately left Lavilla Lutz on the welfare rolls.42' In the litiga-
tion, she sought to set aside a premarital agreement under which the
410. Davis v. Miller, 7 P.3d 1223, 1229 (Kan. 2000).
411. Id. at 1228, 1231.
412. Id. at 1227, 1229.
413. Id. at 1227.
414. Id. at 1228.
415. Id. at 1233.
416. Davis, 7 P.3d at 1232.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 1231-33.
419. 2000 ND 226, 620 N.W.2d 589, 592.
420. See id. (Lutz II1); 1997 ND 82, 563 N.W.2d 90 (Lutz 1); 1999 ND 121, 595 N.W.2d
590 (Lutz II).
421. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 100.
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parties waived any share of the other's estate and consented to each
other's wills.422 Emanuel's lawyer drafted his will, Lavilla's will, and
the premarital agreement at the same time.423 Emanuel's will left his
wife their marital home (an apartment in a duplex) for life or until
she remarried, along with the furniture, household items and per-
sonalty used in connection with it, and the family car.424 Lavilla chal-
lenged the agreement on both procedural and substantive grounds,
arguing that it was neither voluntary nor conscionable.425 Her attack
on the voluntariness of the agreement was twofold. She argued that
she did not seek independent representation because she believed
that Emanuel's lawyer was representing her in connection with the
premarital agreement, and he did not advise her to seek independ-
ent counsel.426
Second, she claimed that she entered the agreement based on
Emanuel's oral assurances that he would provide for her outside the
will, which he failed to do.427 Her challenge to the substantive fairness
of the agreement was that husband's provisions for her were so negli-
gible that the agreement was unconscionable at its execution.42 Also,
because she would become a public charge without additional sup-
port, she argued that it was unconscionable at enforcement as well.429
North Dakota's version of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
invalidates premarital agreements if they are involuntary or uncon-
scionable at execution and made without disclosure.43 ° Another state
statute gives the court discretion if it finds the enforcement of an
agreement to be clearly unconscionable.43' The court may refuse to en-
force the agreement, enforce only the conscionable part of it, or limit
422. Id. at 92.
423. Lutz, 620 N.W.2d at 592.
424. Will of Emanuel Lutz, at 1 (Feb. 1, 1988) (copy on file with author).
425. Lutz, 620 N.W.2d at 594-96. Mrs. Lutz made two other claims in this litigation,
one for compensation for care of Mr. Lutz during his last illness, and one based on language
in his will that conditioned the residuary clause, leaving the remainder of his estate to
his children and grandchildren, on Mrs. Lutz's failure to survive him. Id. at 593-94, 597.
Her claim was that because she did survive Mr. Lutz, the residuary clause was inoperative
and she was entitled to an intestate share. Id. at 597. The trial court denied her claim
for services, finding that she failed to overcome the presumption that such services are
gratuitous by proving a contract for payment for them. In re Estate of Emanuel Lutz, No.
94-C-2850, slip op. at 3-5 (S. Cent. Jud. Dist. N.D. June 30, 1998). The supreme court
thought the will ambiguous, filled in the ambiguity by looking at the premarital agree-
ment and the intent expressed in it to leave the residue of Lutz's estate to his children
and grandchildren, and declared the condition of survivorship a "drafting error." Lutz,
620 N.W.2d at 597-98.
426. Id. at 594.
427. Id. at 595.
428. In re Estate of Lutz, 1997 ND 82, 563 N.W.2d 90, 99.
429. Id. at 100.
430. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06 (2005).
431. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2005).
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the application of the unconscionable part so as to avoid an unconscio-
nable result.4 2 Still a third statutory section, enacted after Emanuel's
death but before the litigation had been resolved, provides that
waivers of spousal rights on death are unenforceable if enforcement
would make the surviving spouse eligible for public assistance.433
On the issue of voluntariness, Lavilla's testimony was pitted
against that of Emanuel's lawyer, who was in the position of de-
fending himself against Lavilla's claim that he acted improperly, and
Emanuel's daughter, who was a co-executor of her father's estate and
one of the residuary beneficiaries of his will.4 34 Emanuel's lawyer
testified that he had told Lavilla that he was representing only her
husband and that she should consult her own attorney.435 He also de-
nied that Emanuel made oral promises to Lavilla about providing
for her outside the will.436 Emanuel's daughter testified that neither
Emanuel nor Lavilla had informed her about any promise to provide
Lavilla with additional income.4 37 The trial court decided against
Lavilla on the issue of the voluntariness of the agreement but made
no specific findings about what Emanuel's lawyer did or said or what
Emanuel might have promised.43 The trial court held that the agree-
ment was not unconscionable at execution under the Uniform Act be-
cause Emanuel had made full disclosure.439 In an earlier stage in the
litigation, it found the agreement clearly unconscionable in result but
later reversed itself on this point; it held the statute invalidating waiv-
ers of spousal rights on death in Lavilla's circumstances inapplicable
to her because it was enacted after the Lutz agreement was signed
and after Emanuel had died.440 It accepted the executors' valuation
of Lavilla's interest in the marital duplex at ninety thousand dollars
(she had contended that it was worth only thirty thousand dollars)
and the value of the estate as four hundred thousand dollars.441 The
supreme court could have decided the issues of voluntariness and un-
conscionability de novo but chose instead to rely on the trial court.442
432. Id.
433. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-07(2)(a) (2005).
434. In re Estate of Lutz, 2000 ND 226, 620 N.W.2d 589, 591, 595.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 596.
440. Lutz, 620 N.W.2d at 597.
441. Id. at 597. It went on to make findings about Mrs. Lutz's financial needs in case
the supreme court decided that she was, after all, entitled to additional income from the
estate. It found that Mrs. Lutz's total income was $659 a month and that she would need
an additional $250 a month to stay off the welfare rolls. In re Estate of Emanuel Lutz,
No. 94-C-2850, slip op. at 4 (S. Cent. Jud. Dist. N.D. June 30, 1998).
442. In re Estate of Lutz, 2000 N.D. 226, 620 N.W.2d 589, 596-97.
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Because certain crucial findings were absent from the trial court re-
cord, the supreme court implied them, namely that Emanuel's lawyer
had told Lavilla that he was representing only Mr. Lutz, that he had
advised her to seek independent counsel, and that Emanuel had made
no promises to provide for Lavilla outside of his will.443 The court
accepted the trial court's conclusions on unconscionability and the
inapplicability of the statute allowing modification of death rights
waivers.4" It instead could have applied the spousal waiver statute
despite the date of its enactment. Other jurisdictions propound au-
thority for the proposition that a statute that reflects a change in
public policy may be applied retroactively.445 Similarly, the supreme
court could have invoked another statutory section providing that any
provision of a contract is unlawful if it is contrary to the policy of
express law.446
In Cannon v. Cannon, the Court of Appeals of Maryland447 took
the opportunity to update its law of premarital agreements.44 The
couple involved lived together for four years before they became en-
gaged.449 Wendy had been through an earlier marriage and divorce
and had two children from it.45° Two months before the wedding,
John, who earned about forty thousand dollars a year, more than
double what Wendy made, raised the subject of a premarital agree-
ment.45 ' He was concerned about bankruptcy proceedings begun
against Wendy and her former husband, fearing that creditors might
reach his assets after the impending marriage.452 Thus, about a month
before the wedding, the couple executed a premarital agreement pre-
pared by John's lawyer in which Wendy waived all marital rights,
agreed to pay John one thousand dollars a month during the mar-
riage toward mortgage expenses and utilities, and empowered him to
require her and her children to leave the marital residence on sixty
443. Id. at 595.
444. Id. at 596-97.
445. See Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 764 N.E.2d 950,953 (N.Y. 2001), discussed infra notes
698-708 ('The general principle that the validity of a contract depends upon the law that
existed at the time the contract was made does not appertain to variations of the law
that are made due to changes in public policy."); cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1008 subdiv.
c ("If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants
it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a dif-
ferent order.").
446. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-01(2) (2006).
447. The Court of Appeals is the highest state court in Maryland. See Maryland
Judiciary, http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2006).
448. 865 A.2d 563 (Md. 2005).
449. Id. at 577.
450. Id. at 566.
451. Id. at 568.
452. Id.
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days notice.45" The agreement recited disclosure and that each party
had been free to seek independent counsel, although Wendy was not
represented.454
When the parties separated seven years later, John asserted the
premarital agreement.455 Wendy challenged its validity, arguing that
she entered it on the basis of the parties' oral expressed intent to pro-
tect John from any consequences of her bankruptcy and that the par-
ties did not intend it to be a permanent waiver of her marital rights.456
She also argued that to enforce it against her would be unconsciona-
ble because of its one-sided terms and the fact that it was intended
to be a temporary expedient during the specter of bankruptcy. 457 The
trial court agreed with her, holding in an oral opinion that the agree-
ment was valid only until 1996 when the threat of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings against Wendy had terminated.458 The court thought that the
confidential relationship between the parties justified her reliance on
the parties' understanding to make the agreement only a temporary
waiver of her marital property rights.459 The court called the terms
"draconian," specifically noting that under them she would waive all
rights to alimony, death benefits by reason of the marriage, any claim
for retirement benefits, and that she could be forced out of the marital
house on sixty days notice.46 °
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding that the
trial court had given too much weight to the parties' oral understand-
ing in evaluating the alleged unfairness of the agreement, which was
not ambiguous on its face and contained no stated time limit other
than dissolution of the marriage.46 ' The Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the validity of the agreement.462 It said that in Maryland the
parties to a premarital agreement are in a confidential relationship
as a matter of law and are thus expected to make full, frank, and
truthful disclosure to each other at the time of execution of the agree-
ment.463 The import of the relationship, explained the court, is that
the party seeking to enforce the agreement must bear the burden of
proving its validity. 4' Even placing the burden on John in this case,
453. Id. at 569.
454. Cannon, 865 A.2d at 566-67.
455. Id. at 568-70.
456. Id. at 567.
457. Id. at 567, 588.
458. Id. at 566-67.
459. Id. at 567.
460. Id. at 569, 588 n.23.
461. Cannon v. Cannon, 846 A.2d 1127, 1137-38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affd, 865
A.2d 563 (Md. 2005).
462. Cannon, 865 A.2d at 588.
463. Id. at 574.
464. Id.
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the evidence showed Wendy had seventeen days between presentation
of the agreement and its execution to seek independent counsel.465
She also had some knowledge about her husband's assets from living
with him for four years before their marriage, although the court ac-
knowledged that the disclosure he made was imperfect.4 6 He did not
ever tell her the purchase price of the home, the mortgage to which
she was contributing, or his income.46 v Furthermore, the premarital
agreement attached no values to the listed assets.468 The court also
attributed to her an understanding of the significance of waivers
due to her earlier divorce.469 It emphasized that although the trial
court had called the agreement "draconian," that court had, neverthe-
less, held that the agreement was valid until the bankruptcy threat
ended.4 70 The court of appeals enunciated what it called the correct
standard for determining the validity of premarital agreements:
whether there is an "overreaching, that is, whether in the atmosphere
and environment of the confidential relationship there was unfairness
or inequity in the result of the agreement or in its procurement. 47'
In this case, according to the court, there was no such overreach-
ing and thus the agreement was still valid at the time of divorce.472
This holding seems to contradict the trial court's characterization of
the facts:
When asked on cross[-]examination, [John] again confirmed...
that the primary purpose of the contract was to [protect] him from
any claims of her creditors coming out of the bankruptcy. He said
he didn't know when the bankruptcy was filed. He didn't know
when that threat would end. But because of the various disputes
[John and Wendy] had, he didn't see any reason to go along with
any termination to that agreement.473
So John, acknowledging the purpose of the agreement as to tide the
couple through Wendy's bankruptcy, decided unilaterally when the
465. Id. at 587.
466. Id. at 586.
467. Id. at 570.
468. Cannon, 865 A.2d at 586.
469. Id. at 570. Courts often say that a previous divorce makes ex-wives legally knowl-
edgeable about waivers, but this is not always a warranted assumption. See, e.g., Austin
v. Austin, 839 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 2005) (reiterating the trial court's finding that the
wife, "having been divorced previously, was fully aware of her rights to alimony, support,
property division, and child support").
470. Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d 563, 567 (Md. 2005).
471. Id. at 584.
472. Id. at 587-88.
473. Cannon v. Cannon, 846 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (quoting trial
court).
2007]
396 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:349
relationship soured to conveniently forget the agreement's original
purpose and meaning. Coupled with his failure to disclose and the
agreement's harsh terms, he is guilty of overreaching.
10. Tennessee
In Bratton v. Bratton the parties married after Michael had com-
pleted his first year of medical school and Cynthia was employed as
a research technician.474 The doctors with whom Cynthia worked pre-
dicted that after medical school her husband would leave her and ad-
vised her that she needed a legally binding agreement for protection.475
Thus, a year after the marriage, the parties signed an agreement that
Michael drafted by hand in which he promised never to cause a di-
vorce between the two and that, if he violated the promise, he would
give his wife half of his present belongings and half of his net future
earnings."' A typed version that the parties signed later superceded
this handwritten version.477 It provided that in the event of divorce
the parties' jointly held properties would be divided equally and that
if Michael was guilty of statutory grounds for divorce and his wife
sought one he would pay her half of all his gross net income.47
After Michael graduated from medical school, became an ortho-
pedic surgeon, and the couple had two children, Michael committed
adultery.479 Cynthia filed for divorce after their eighteen-year mar-
riage and asserted the agreement in the proceeding.4" The trial court
held the property division part of the agreement valid but rejected the
alimony portion on the ground that it lacked consideration.4"' Accord-
ingly, it awarded the wife half of the couple's property and $10,500
a month as alimony, plus additional money for child support.482 The
intermediate appellate court approved of the property division, ali-
mony award, and child support but held that the agreement was
invalid as contrary to public policy because it entitled the wife to
property division and alimony benefits solely on the basis of the hus-
band's fault.483 On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed
474. 136 S.W.3d 595, 597 (Tenn. 2004).
475. Id. at 598.
476. Id. at 597.
477. The parties disagreed about whether he or she took the original to the lawyer,
who acted as scrivener of the second version. Id.
478. Id. at 597-98.
479. Id.
480. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 597-98.
481. Id. at 598.
482. Id. at 598-99.
483. Id. at 599. The court asserted that the agreement impermissibly "preempt[ed"
the marital property regime. Bratton v. Bratton, No. E2002-00432-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL
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the validity of postnuptial agreements, finding them valid and not
contrary to public policy." 4 However, it held that this particular
agreement was invalid because it lacked consideration running from
Cynthia to Michael.4"5 It rejected both foregoing a career or staying
in the marriage as sufficient consideration.4" The former, it said, was
something Cynthia had decided to do before the agreement was en-
tered and the latter, if it was the consideration, would invalidate the
agreement "due to the taint of coercion and duress."4 7 If the court had
analyzed this agreement like a premarital agreement for procedural
and substantive fairness at execution and substantive fairness at en-
forcement, instead of under a consideration rubric, it might very well
have reached the same result. As the intermediate appellate court
observed, Michael's obligation under the applicable child support
guidelines amounted to thirty-two percent of his income.88 Paying
half of his income to his wife would leave him only eighteen percent
for himself, very arguably an unconscionable result.48 9 Interesting to
note is that none of the premarital agreement cases consider the fre-
quent ultimatum "sign the agreement or I won't marry you" to be co-
ercive. How different, one wonders, is the one attributed to Cynthia:
"Sign the agreement or I'll leave the marriage"?
11. Rhode Island
In a serendipitous symmetry, the most recent and last case in
this section leads us back to the very first, In re Marriage of Bonds
and its legislative reversal in California.4"' In Bonds, the California
Supreme Court, applying its version of the Uniform Premarital Agree-
ment Act, upheld the voluntariness of a premarital agreement signed
by an unrepresented wife on the eve of the wedding.49' The California
1191185, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2003), affd on other grounds, 136 S.W.3d 595
(Tenn. 2004).
484. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 599.
485. Id. at 603. The test the court put forth for establishing validity was that the agree-
ment be supported by "adequate consideration, knowledgeably entered into, and there
is no evidence of fraud, coercion or duress." Id. at 605. According to the court, spouses are
in confidential relationships with each other and their agreements are therefore subject
to "close scrutiny." Id. at 601.
486. Id. at 603.
487. Id. A dissenting justice thought there was sufficient consideration, accepting both
versions of what might constitute consideration. See id. at 606-08 (Holder, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
488. Bratton v. Bratton, No.E2002-00432-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 1191185, at*2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2003).
489. Id.
490. See supra Part II.B.2.
491. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 820 (Cal. 2000).
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legislature responded by enacting a rebuttable presumption of
involuntariness for agreements signed in such circumstances.492 In
Marsocci v. Marsocci,493 Rhode Island courts decided a similar issue
under Rhode Island's unique version of the Uniform Act.494 Under the
Rhode Island statute, involuntariness alone is not a ground for in-
validating a premarital agreement.4 95 To succeed, a challenger must
prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence: she entered
the agreement involuntarily, the agreement was unconscionable
when executed, and she was not provided with fair and reasonable
disclosure before its execution.496
In Marsocci, Debra and David signed a premarital agreement
four days before the wedding.497 Debra was already pregnant with the
couple's only child.498 David was represented by counsel; Debra was
not.499 The agreement contained a declaration that each party had
"fully disclosed [his or her] approximate net worth."' 00 The agree-
ment listed David's assets as six parcels of real estate, three motor
vehicles, and a company checking account.01 It did not assign values
to any of these.0 2 It showed "no assets" for Debra.0 ' The agreement
provided that David's listed assets and any income or other value
they produced during the marriage would be his separate proper-
ty.504 As David's business was selling and buying properties, the pro-
vision seemed to insulate the business and its income from division
as marital property on divorce.05
When the parties did divorce after a seven-year marriage, Debra
challenged the validity of the premarital agreement.0 6 She argued
that it was involuntary and unconscionable and that David had not
made fair and reasonable disclosure. ' The trial court agreed with
her and looked to California for guidance on the meaning of volun-
tariness. It applied that state's statutory presumption that a pre-
marital agreement is involuntary unless the court finds, among other
492. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
493. 911 A.2d 690 (R.I. 2006).
494. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-17-1 (2006).
495. Id. § 15-17-6.
496. Id. § 15-17-6 (a), (b).
497. Marsocci, 911 A.2d at 692.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 699.
501. Id. at 692.
502. Id. at 698 n.4.
503. Marsocci, 911 A.2d at 698 n.4.
504. Id. at 694 n.2, 698.
505. Id. at 698.
506. Id. at 692-93.
507. Id. at 694.
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things, that the party challenging it, if unrepresented, was fully in-
formed of the terms and basic effects of the agreement as well as the
rights and obligations she was giving up by signing it.5"' The trial
court held that this presumption combined with David's failure to pro-
vide dollar values for assets or net worth and the absence of a written
waiver of disclosure by Debra caused the agreement to be involun-
tary and disclosure less than fair and reasonable."0 9 The trial court
further found the agreement unconscionable based on the parties'
confidential relationship and the fact that it precluded any accu-
mulation of marital assets in which Debra could share on divorce.510
Accordingly, it invalidated the agreement and made an equitable
distribution of the couple's property.51" '
Both parties appealed. David contended that Debra failed to
prove the three elements required under the Rhode Island statute,
and Debra contended that she was entitled to half of the marital es-
tate rather than the one-third the trial court awarded. 12 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court reversed, holding the premarital agreement
valid and the trial court's reliance on California law unwarranted.513
In Rhode Island involuntariness cannot be presumed; it must be
found separately by clear and convincing evidence.1 4 Similarly,
Rhode Island courts require clear and convincing evidence to find a
lack of fair and reasonable disclosure and unconscionability." 5 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court found no evidence in the record that
Debra did not execute the agreement voluntarily; David's list of as-
sets without specific values and the acknowledgment in the agree-
ment that each party had disclosed approximate net worth were
"adequate.""6 Although the trial court was correct in finding the pre-
marital agreement unconscionable, unconscionability alone was not
enough to invalidate it. The court, in an apparent effort to help Debra
on remand, softened the agreement's potential effect by holding that
it did not permanently freeze David's separate assets and their future
products in a separate state.1 7 Separate assets could still be trans-
muted into marital assets; any that had been so transmuted as well
as any appreciation in value of separate assets resulting from
508. Id. at 693.
509. Marsocci, 911 A.2d at 695.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 697.
514. Id.
515. Marsocci, 911 A.2d at 699.
516. Id. at 698.
517. Id. at 699.
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marital efforts were marital property subject to equitable distribu-
tion on divorce.518
C. Pure Substance
1. Permissible Subjects of Agreement: Alimony, Palimony, and
Children
Although premarital agreements are now generally enforceable,
courts and legislatures are still reluctant to allow parties to privately
control certain subjects through them.519 Spousal support has tradi-
tionally been one of these. As a policy matter, the state is fearful that
a divorced, formerly dependent spouse will have to go on public assis-
tance as the result of agreements that modify or eliminate spousal
support rights.52 Understandably, it would prefer to have an ex-
spouse foot the bill whenever possible. Some states have thus barred
spousal support as a permissible subject of premarital agreement.
5 2 '
Others, including those that have adopted the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act in its promulgated form, do allow parties to contract
about spousal support.522 The Act, however, provides for a second look
at support waivers on divorce and permits courts to override any that
will cause an ex-spouse to become a public charge. 3 Some states
have enacted identical "second-look" provisions for agreements that
waive elective or intestate shares on death of a spouse.524 States that
have not adopted the Act, or any other relevant statute, subject sup-
port waivers to the same second-look tests for fairness at enforcement
as they do other provisions of premarital agreements. 25
Since 2000, two more states have joined the permissive trend
allowing spousal support rights to be a subject of premarital
518. Id.
519. See, e.g., Sanford v. Sanford, 694 N.W.d 283, 288 (S.D. 2005).
520. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (2006).
521. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 596.5(2) (2006); Sanford, 694 N.W.2d at 288.
522. Sanford, 694 N.W.2d at 288 n.2.
523. The Act provides
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal sup-
port and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement
to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time
of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of
the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to the extent
necessary to avoid that eligibility.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGMT. ACT § 6(b) (1983).
524. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-07(2)(a) (2005).
525. For example, New York (N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (2005)); New Hampshire
(MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585, 589 (N.H. 1989)); Massachusetts (DeMatteo v.
DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797, 811-13 (Mass. 2002)).
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agreement.5 26 The California legislature initially enacted the Act
without its support provisions, but it did not expressly prohibit such
waivers.527 In Pendleton v. Fireman, the California Supreme Court
reexamined the common law prohibition, finding it "anachronistic.""52
Accordingly, it upheld a premarital waiver of alimony against the
wife,529 noting that it was an agreement between "educated, intelli-
gent" prospective spouses who appeared "to be self-sufficient in prop-
erty and earning ability" and had the advice of counsel at the time
they executed the waiver.53 In response to this judicial fiat, the state
legislature passed a new law providing that alimony waivers are not
enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought was not
represented by independent counsel or if the waiver was unconscio-
nable at the time of enforcement.53' The law provides further that
independent representation does not sanitize an otherwise uncon-
scionable waiver.532 South Carolina similarly changed course on the
enforceability of premarital support waivers. In Hardee v. Hardee, the
supreme court overruled earlier cases that pointed to the conclusion
that waivers of support rights in premarital agreements were void as
against public policy.533 It enforced a waiver against a wife who was
totally disabled, unable to support herself, and would become a public
charge as a result.534 Unlike California and South Carolina, South
Dakota rejected the opportunity to "modernize" its law, adhering to
the traditional position that alimony is not a proper subject of premar-
ital agreement.535 In Sanford v. Sanford, the South Dakota Supreme
Court struck down a provision in a premarital agreement that bound
Denny to pay Colleen $144,000 on termination of their marriage.5"6
The payment was structured like alimony: on the first business day of
the month for thirty-six months, Denny was to pay Colleen four thou-
sand dollars, and his obligation would cease if she died, remarried,
526. E.g., Hardee v. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d 501, 503 (S.C. 2003); Pendleton v. Fireman,
5 P.3d 839, 848 (Cal. 2000).
527. Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 841.
528. Id. at 845.
529. See infra note 604 and accompanying text (discussing the Massachusetts Supreme
Court's refusal to retroactively apply new law in Sullivan v. Burkin).
530. Id. at 848. Unlike virtually all of the other cases covered by this article, the husband
and wife in Pendleton seemed to occupy roughly equal bargaining positions. At the time
of divorce, each had assets worth approximately $2.5 million. Id. at 840. She had a master's
degree and was an aspiring writer; he had degrees in law and pharmacology and invested
in business ventures. Id.
531. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (2006).
532. Id.
533. 585 S.E.2d 501, 504 (S.C. 2003).
534. For discussion of Hardee, see infra notes 646-74 and accompanying text.
535. Sanford v. Sanford, 694 N.W.2d 283, 295 (S.D. 2005).
536. Id. at 285-86.
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or cohabited with an adult male.537 Wife agreed to make no other
claim against husband on divorce "in the nature of support, alimony,
property settlement or otherwise.""53 The supreme court, voiding the
provision as alimony, unaccountably held it enforceable as a prop-
erty division.539
Langley v. Langley, a Georgia case, raised the policy question of
whether a husband who was obligated to pay his wife a lump sum in
alimony on divorce would be allowed to set off against it his payments
of temporary alimony and attorneys' fees made in earlier divorce pro-
ceedings that he had commenced and dismissed.54 ° The trial court
allowed the setoff, but the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed.54' It
noted the great disparity in the financial positions of Robert and
Nancy and the fact that Robert's earlier proceedings were the cause
of the fees and support he was now trying to deduct from his alimony
obligation." 2 The court appropriately concluded that to allow the set-
off "would effectively allow Mr. Langley to use the ... agreement to
place Ms. Langley in the untenable position of forfeiting her $25,000
entitlement or rendering herself financially, and thus legally, defense-
less in the ... divorce action which proceeded to judgment. 548
Two other cases, one from Florida and the other from Wisconsin,
dealt with the questions of whether a prevailing party attorney's fees
provision and a waiver of homestead rights, respectively, were appro-
priate subjects of premarital agreement. In Lashkajani v. Lashkajani,
after a ten-year marriage that produced three children, Amy unsuc-
cessfully challenged a provision of the premarital agreement on pro-
cedural and substantive grounds.5 44 Both parties asked for attorneys'
fees.545 Hadi based his claim on the provision of the agreement that
provided that attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in litigating
the agreement were to be paid by the losing party.546 The trial court
537. Id. at 286.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 295.
540. 613 S.E.2d 614, 615 (Ga. 2005).
541. Id. at 615, 617.
542. Id. at 616.
543. Id. at 617. The court went on to interpret the language of the premarital agree-
ment to support this result. The lump sum was payable to Nancy "should their marriage
dissolve." Id. The parties were bound to it "in the event the marriage should be dissolved
or terminated by legal proceedings." Id. The quoted language, said the court, showed the
parties' expectations that Robert was to pay the lump sum as a result of the dissolution
of the marriage and that it was not to include sums spent in obtaining the divorce or in
earlier litigation. Id.
544. 911 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2005).
545. Id. at 1155.
546. Id. The wife based her claim on a Florida statute empowering courts to use equity
in dissolution proceedings. Id. at 1156. Thus the trial court awarded the wife roughly
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awarded him sixty-three thousand dollars for attorney's fees based on
Amy's unsuccessful challenge to the agreement.547 She appealed the
award, arguing that prevailing party provisions in premarital agree-
ments were tantamount to waivers of spousal support rights during
marriage and therefore void under Florida law.5 48 The Supreme Court
of Florida upheld the provision as a proper subject of premarital con-
tract as more closely related to distribution of assets after marriage
than to support during marriage.549 In Jones v. Estate of Jones, the
pertinent issue was whether statutory homestead protection could be
waived in a premarital agreement, a question of first impression in
Wisconsin.55 ° The court, in holding that a premarital agreement could
effectively waive homestead protection and the one at issue did so, ex-
plained that the purpose of homestead is to protect spouses from uni-
lateral action by one of them to the detriment of the other.55' Where
the spouses act together by means of a premarital agreement, it ex-
plained, there is no violation of the policy underlying the protection.
552
In sharp contrast to the harsh results found in some of the alimony
waiver and limitation cases stands In Re Estate of Roccamonte.553
Arthur and Mary had a twenty-five year relationship, during which
Arthur remained married to his wife with whom he had two chil-
dren.554 Although Arthur lived with Mary and supported her lav-
ishly, filed joint income tax returns with his wife, and supported their
children, he disregarded his accountant's reminders that he ought
to make a will.555 Mary knew of these facts and nevertheless con-
tinued the relationship.556 When Arthur died intestate, Mary brought
a claim against the estate alleging that Arthur promised to support
her for the rest of her life.557 The litigation wound through the courts
for seven years, until the New Jersey Supreme Court reached out to
save Mary, by then seventy-seven with no assets and living in pov-
erty. 58 It did so by invoking its original jurisdiction to find that
Arthur had made the oral promise she had alleged to support her for
twice ($117,022.42) the amount Hadi was awarded, under the Florida statute, because
her challenge was in good faith and not frivolous. Id. at 1155-56.
547. Id. at 1156.
548. Id.
549. Id. at 1158.
550. 646 N.W.2d 280, 281-82 (Wis. 2002).
551. Id. at 285-86.
552. Id. at 286.
553. 808 A.2d 838 (N.J. 2002).
554. Id. at 840.
555. In re Estate of Roccamonte, 735 A.2d 614, 616-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
556. Roccamonte, 808 A.2d at 840-41.
557. Id. at 841.
558. She was dependent on social security of less than one thousand dollars per month
and food stamps. Id. at 842.
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the rest of her life.559 The court further held that unlike an alimony
obligation, the promise was not discharged by Arthur's death but
could be enforced against his estate.56 ° It remanded the matter for
a determination of the value of Mary's right to support.561
Another sensitive subject is child support. Even the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, which tolerates agreements modifying
or eliminating spousal support, provides that "the right of a child to
support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.5 62
In T.F. v. B.L., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dealt
with the question of whether a child's right to support had been
created by an alleged agreement between two female cohabitants,
now "divorced. 563 Plaintiff, the child's biological mother, alleged an
agreement with defendant, her former cohabitant, to create and co-
parent a child; plaintiff sought to enforce the agreement by means
of a child support order from the court.5" The trial court found an im-
plied agreement as alleged but refused to enforce it. 565 The supreme
court agreed, holding that '"parenthood by contract' [was] not the law
of Massachusetts and the agreement [was] unenforceable as against
public policy." '566 Three justices dissented; they would have enforced
the defendant's promise to pay child support as in society's and the
child's best interests.
567
2. Substantive Unfairness at Execution and/or Enforcement
Based on Disparity in Spouses'Finances and Earning Power
One can see that, at least in jurisdictions where prospective
spouses are held to be in confidential relationships, disparity between
the provision made for one party to the agreement and the other's
resources can raise a rebuttable presumption of undue influence or
fraud.5 68 As parties to premarital agreements are usually unequal
in terms of wealth and their ability to generate income, and the pur-
pose of such agreements is to protect the assets of the wealthy party
559. Id. at 846.
560. Id. at 848.
561. Id.
562. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGMT. AcT § 3(b) (1983).
563. 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004).
564. Id.
565. Id. at 1246.
566. Id.
567. See id. at 1255-58 (Greaney, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Even
though we do not recognize parenthood by contract, an agreement between the parties
has been proved, which includes a promise of support .... The child may have been
abandoned by the defendant, but he should not be abandoned by the court."). Id. at 1258.
568. See, e.g., Banks v. Evans, 64 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Ark. 2002); Sogg v. Nevada State
Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 784 (Nev. 1992).
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from the other's reach, it is unusual to find the disparity alone argued
as constituting substantive unfairness or unconscionability at exe-
cution or enforcement. Yet since 2000, wives in six cases advanced
such an argument, winning acceptance in four lower courts, failing ul-
timately in three courts of last resort, and achieving limited success
in the fourth.
a. Georgia
In Adams v. Adams, Andy's wealth at execution of the agreement
far exceeded that of his wife-to-be Kay; he was worth $4.5 million and
was an established businessman, and she had thirty thousand dollars
and was employed as a beautician.569 Andy presented the agreement
to Kay two days before the wedding.57° She was not represented by
counsel in signing it. 57' Under the agreement, Andy's sole obligation
to her on divorce was ten thousand dollars per year for every year of
marriage with a cap of one hundred thousand dollars. 2 When Kay
sought a divorce after eight-and-a-half years of marriage, she chal-
lenged the agreement as unconscionable at execution and enforce-
ment based on the disparity between its provisions for her and her
husband's assets.573 Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Georgia upheld the validity of the agreement.57 4 The supreme court
asserted that because Andy had given Kay full and fair disclosure be-
fore voluntarily entering into the agreement, and she knew the legal
impact of it, having the opportunity to consult counsel about it, 575 the
569. Adams v. Adams, No. 03HV25T, Exhibit A at 5-6 (Sup. Ct. Ga. Oct. 16, 2003) (the
premarital agreement). According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, however, Kay "success-
fully ran her own business" at the time of its execution. 603 S.E.2d 273, 274 (Ga. 2004).
570. Adams, 603 S.E.2d at 274.
571. Id. at 274-75.
572. Id. at 274. It also provided that if, at divorce, husband's net worth declined below
its premarital level the payment to wife was to be decreased proportionately. Adams, No.
03HV25T, Exhibit A at 9. The agreement contained no corresponding provision for increase
in payments to wife if his net worth rose above its premarital level. Id. If wife committed
"unforgiven" adultery she forfeited all payments. Adams, 603 S.E.2d at 274.
573. Adams, 603 S.E.2d at 274.
574. Id. at 275.
575. Although the court record does not divulge when Andy first presented the agree-
ment to Kay, she signed it two days before the wedding. Id. The agreement says that the
drafting attorney was retained by Andy and "Kay acknowledges that she has sought advice
elsewhere and in no manner relies on any representations... from Andy's attorney to
her." Adams, No. 03HV25T, Exhibit A at 3. Nevertheless she appears to have been un-
represented. See Adams, 603 S.E.2d at 274-75. The supreme court seemed satisfied
however to take the agreement's recitals at face value. See id. at 275. But see Corbett v.
Corbett, 628 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 2006), discussed supra text accompanying notes 275-84, a
later Supreme Court of Georgia decision in which the court specifically found all such
representations in the premarital agreement to be untrue.
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fact that the agreement preserved the disparity between the parties'
estates did not in itself make the agreement unconscionable.576
In Mallen v. Mallen, discussed in the procedural fairness context
earlier, 7 Catherine argued, among other things, that the disparity
in financial situations and business experience between her and Peter
made the premarital agreement unconscionable at execution and that
the increase in disparity by the time of enforcement - Peter's assets
had grown by fourteen million dollars - made it unconscionable then
as well.57 The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected both contentions
summarily.57 a Peter did not commit fraud, and the agreement was
not unconscionable despite the fact that the it perpetuated the dis-
parity between the members of the couple. Neither did the increase
in Peter's assets during marriage constitute a sufficient change in
circumstances to make enforcing the agreement unfair and unrea-
sonable.8 ° The court thought that significant growth in a rich man's
assets over many years was foreseeable.5"'
b. Massachusetts
At the time DeMatteo v. DeMatteo came to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, the test for the validity of premarital agree-
ments under state law was that they be fair and reasonable at both
the time of execution and of enforcement.582 In the DeMatteo case,
Susan was an executive secretary at a local bank before she and her
daughter moved in with Joseph.5" She then stopped working and be-
came financially dependent on him.5" Ultimately she found herself
pregnant, and the two decided to marry.5"5 At the time, the parties'
financial situations were disparate. 8 Joseph's net worth as disclosed
by the premarital agreement was between one hundred eight and one
hundred thirty-three million dollars derived from family businesses
and investments; Susan's financial statement showed assets of less
576. Adams, 603 S.E.2d at 275. The court also upheld the trial court's refusal to admit
evidence of the husband's alleged infidelity during the marriage. Id. It acknowledged,
however, that "there may be rare circumstances where such evidence could be relevant
to demonstrate unconscionability or changed circumstances." Id. at 275.
577. See supra text accompanying notes 250-74.
578. 622 S.E.2d 812, 816-17 (Ga. 2005).
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 817.
582. 762 N.E.2d 797,806, 808 (Mass. 2002); Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 4, DeMatteo
v. DeMatteo, No. 2001-P-439 (Mass. Ap. Ct. May 7, 2001).
583. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 801, 803.
584. Id. at 813.
585. Id.
586. Id.
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than five thousand dollars and ownership of a 1977 Chevrolet Nova
auto.5 87 Her salary at the bank had been twenty-five thousand dollars
annually.588 In the period before execution of the premarital agree-
ment, Susan was represented by the counsel recommended by
Joseph's friend and paid for by Joseph.589 As executed, the agree-
ment gave Susan thirty-five thousand dollars a year in alimony and
medical insurance until her death or remarriage, the marital home
free of encumbrances, and a car. 9° It also provided that all jointly
held property would be divided equally between the parties.591 The
agreement was signed after some, but not extensive, negotiation
between the parties' lawyers.592 When husband filed for divorce ten
years later, Susan challenged the agreement's substantive fairness.593
The trial court held that the premarital agreement was not "fair and
reasonable" at either execution or enforcement.594 It based its deter-
mination on what Susan was entitled to under the agreement: "the
entirety of the financial settlement, the lack of substantial negotia-
tions" at execution, the lifestyle the couple was accustomed to during
the marriage, and the disparity between the parties' ability to earn
future income.595 Noting the ten-year length of the marriage and the
fact that it produced two children, the trial court called the settlement
'less than modest." '596 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed,597 laying out the tests for fairness at execution and enforce-
ment.598 As to substantive fairness at execution, it explained that only
where the challenger is "essentially stripped of substantially all mari-
tal interests" will a premarital agreement not be "fair and reason-
able."5 Additionally, it discarded the "fair and reasonable" standard
for testing validity at enforcement and adopted "unconscionability" in
its stead.' The court purported only to be giving a new label to what
was in essence the same standard, so as to distinguish the test for
validity of premarital agreements from the test for separation agree-
ments,60 1 but the court contradicted itself when it said earlier that the
587. Id. at 802.
588. Id. at 801.
589. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d at 801.
590. Id. at 803.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 802.
593. Id. at 803.
594. Id.
595. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d at 803.
596. Id. at 804.
597. Id. at 814.
598. Id. at 813.
599. Id. at 809.
600. Id. at 813.
601. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d at 813.
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test of unconscionability would require a "greater showing of inappro-
priateness" than the old.6°2 To meet the new test a wife would have
to be left "without sufficient property, maintenance, or appropriate
employment to support herself.603 The court applied the new test to
Susan, noting that she was "not unable to work should she choose to
supplement her income.
'" 60 4
The same substantive issue came up before the court three years
later in Austin v. Austin.6 °5 Donna was represented by a lawyer who
drafted the premarital agreement that the parties signed two days
before their wedding.60 6 Again, there was a disparity in the parties'
assets, with Craig disclosing one million dollars while Donna listed
thirty-five thousand dollars consisting largely of fur and jewelry.0 7
At the time the parties signed the agreement, Donna worked at a
Boston department store.0 8 She continued to work there until the
couple's daughter was born when, by agreement with Craig, she be-
came a full-time homemaker." 9 The agreement contemplated the ac-
quisition of marital property subject to division, but Donna waived
all rights to alimony.610 When the couple divorced twelve years later,
Donna challenged the agreement.61' The trial court invalidated the
alimony waiver as not fair and reasonable at either execution or en-
forcement in view of the great disparity of earning potential of the
parties.612 It awarded Donna one thousand dollars a month in ali-
mony, and, as her share of marital property, $1.275 million in equity
in the marital home plus over five hundred thousand dollars in cash.613
The court noted that during the marriage, the "husband made it his
mission ... to prevent the creation of joint marital assets."6 4 The
intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court, agreeing that
602. Id. at 809.
603. Id. at 812.
604. Id. at 813. But see the same court's refusal to apply a new test retroactively in
Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Mass. 1984) (holding for the first time that a
widow could elect against her husband's revocable inter vivos trust but applying the new
rule prospectively only, not to the litigants in the case, because "[i]n the area of property
law, the retroactive invalidation of an established principle [of law] is to be undertaken
with great caution").
605. 839 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2005).
606. Id. at 839.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 841.
609. Immediately after the marriage she began, with husband's assistance, a year-long
fertility treatment that was apparently successful. Austin v. Austin, 819 N.E.2d 623, 631
(Mass. App. Ct. 2004), rev'd, 839 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2005).
610. Austin, 839 N.E.2d at 839-40.
611. Austin, 819 N.E.2d at 625-26.
612. Austin, 839 N.E.2d at 840-41.
613. Id. at 841.
614. Id. at 842.
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the alimony waiver was not fair and reasonable at execution.615 The
supreme judicial court reversed, finding the alimony waiver fair and
reasonable at execution and not unconscionable at enforcement.616
Two judges dissented, lamenting the agreement's effect: 'The court
today.., denies a woman, in her fifties, with a high school education,
and a child to raise, her right to receive alimony.6 17 They argued fur-
ther that in doing so the majority had "analytically transposed the
proper order that governs examination of the validity of antenuptial
agreements. 6 8 What the majority did here, they claimed, was to look
first at the impact of the agreement on the wife at enforcement; find-
ing that she was awarded some marital property, it then validated
the alimony waiver at execution as well.619 In their view the majority
"implicitly overruled portions of the DeMatteo decision" by holding
that an agreement that is proper at enforcement is valid even if it
was unconscionable at the time of execution.62 °
c. Arkansas
The fifth case in which the wife raised the disparity issue is
Banks v. Evans from Arkansas.62' Christy and Jim signed a premari-
tal agreement three or four days before their wedding. 2 Both were
represented by counsel at the time.6 2 After a separation less than a
year later and a failed reconciliation attempt ten months after that,
Jim filed for divorce asserting the premarital agreement in which
Christy had waived all marital property rights 4.6 Her counsel urged
that the agreement was unconscionable because Jim "may be a mil-
lionaire and [Christy] has nothing. 625 She argued that the disparity
between husband's means and the lack of provision for her in the
agreement raised a presumption of fraudulent concealment by hus-
band.626 All three courts that ruled on the question thought that the
615. Austin v. Austin, 819 N.E.2d 623, 632 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). It did not consider
Craig's argument that in assessing its validity at enforcement, the trial court used the
wrong standard, fairness and reasonableness, instead of unconscionability in accordance
with DeMatteo. DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 801, 811 (2002).
616. Austin v. Austin, 839 N.E.2d 837, 843 (Mass. 2005).
617. Id. at 843 (Greaney, J., dissenting).
618. Id. at 844.
619. Id.
620. Id. at 844-45.
621. 64 S.W.3d 746 (Ark. 2002).
622. Id. at 748.
623. Id. at 751 (mentioning the wife's attorney; assumably based on the apparent sophis-
tication of the husband, he too was represented by counsel).
624. Id. at 748.
625. Evans v. Evans, No. E-97-255, letter op. at 1-2 (Ch. & Prob. Ct. Ark. Nov. 11, 1998)
(on file with author).
626. Id. at 1.
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evidence of her actual knowledge of Jim's assets and her waiver of
disclosure in the agreement sufficiently rebutted the presumption
and held that the agreement was valid.627
d. Kentucky
Most recently in Lane v. Lane, the Kentucky Supreme Court
ruled on the validity of an alimony waiver in a premarital agree-
ment."8 David and Paula married in 1990 when he was twenty-six
and she was twenty-nine.629 He was a college graduate and already a
successful stockbroker earning $166,000 a year; she had only a high
school education, was working as a night desk clerk in a hotel, and
earning nineteen thousand dollars a year.6 3' The couple, each rep-
resented by independent counsel, signed the premarital agreement
three days before their wedding. 13 1 The parties waived rights to ali-
mony; they also agreed that the separate property of each would be
nonmarital and that David's interests in the partnership, profit-
sharing, and pension plans connected to his firm would be sheltered
from division as marital property on divorce.6 32 The agreement also
provided that if either breached the agreement, the defaulting party
would be responsible for attorney's fees and other related expenses. 3
The marriage lasted for nine and a half years and produced two
children.634 Paula quit her job to take care of them while David pur-
sued his career.635 By the time of the divorce, the financial disparity
between spouses had expanded considerably. David's annual income
had grown to over one million dollars a year. 3 6 Paula challenged the
premarital agreement arguing that circumstances thus so changed
during the marriage would make its enforcement against her uncon-
scionable.637 The trial court agreed, but only as to the alimony waiver
and the provision on attorney's fees.638 It awarded her alimony of
twelve thousand dollars a month for three years and attorney's fees
of approximately fifty-nine thousand dollars.639 It also awarded her
627. See, e.g., Banks, 64 S.W.3d at 752.
628. 202 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Ky. 2006).
629. Id. at 578.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. Id.
633. Lane, 202 S.W.3d at 578.
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 579.
638. Id. at 578.
639. Lane, 202 S.W.3d at 579.
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a portion of David's pension plan, despite the agreement."4 The court
of appeals strictly enforced the premarital agreement, reversing the
trial court's decision on alimony and pension rights.64' It upheld the
award of attorney's fees to Paula not because the prevailing party
provision was unconscionable but rather because it did not consider
Paula to be the breaching party. 2 The Kentucky Supreme Court did
not consider the pension issue on appeal. It rejected, as had the trial
court and the court of appeals before it, Paula's contention that the
entire agreement was unconscionable; it found only that the trial
court was well within its discretion in nullifying the alimony waiver
and substituting a three-year award to Paula.643
3. When Enforcement Causes a Spouse to Go on Public
Assistance
In three cases covered by this article,644 the wife argued that the
premarital agreement was invalid because enforcement would force
her on to the welfare rolls. Indeed, such a result at enforcement is one
of the classic "horribles" used to justify the second-look review for one-
sided, oppressive, unconscionable results.64 Surprisingly, the argu-
ment failed in all three cases. Two of the cases, Binek and Lutz, have
been discussed in detail in earlier parts of this article. The third,
Hardee v. Hardee, merits discussion here because of its unusual facts.
It arose in South Carolina, a jurisdiction that still allows divorce
on fault grounds and permits the court to consider fault in making the
division of marital property and alimony awards. 6 At the time Jerry
and Mary met, she was working full time as an office manager and
paralegal at the law firm representing Jerry in divorce proceedings
with his second wife." 7 The parties lived together for about two years
before they married.64 He was a wealthy man; Mary had serious
health problems, including diabetes and sponge kidney disease, which
640. Id. at 581.
641. Id. at 578-79.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 580-81.
644. In re Estate of Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000), discussed supra Part II.B.9;
Binek v. Binek, 2004 ND 5, 673 N.W.2d 594, 599, discussed supra Part II.B.2; Hardee
v. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. 2003).
645. See, e.g., Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810,816 (Mass. 1981); In re Yannalfo, 794
A.2d 795, 798 (N.H. 2002); Delorean v. Delorean, 511 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1986).
646. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (2005) (permitting divorces on the grounds of adultery,
desertion, physical cruelty, habitual drunkenness, and physical separation of more than
one year); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472(2) (2005) (allowing the court to consider fault in
making apportionment of marital property).
647. Hardee v. Hardee, No. 95-DR-43-1751, slip op. at 11 (Fam. Ct. S.C. Nov. 6, 1998).
648. Id.
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Jerry knew prior to their marriage.149 He requested that she sign a
premarital agreement that noted her health problems, provided that
if the parties divorced they would do so only on the no-fault ground of
living apart, and waived all Mary's rights to alimony and attorneys'
fees. 5' She took the agreement to her employer who acted as her
attorney.65' He fully explained its ramifications to her and unequivo-
cally advised her against agreeing to its terms.652 She signed it de-
spite his advice. 5 '
When Jerry left the marriage to continue his affair with a much
younger woman, Mary sought a divorce on fault grounds and the
usual marital property incidents: property division, alimony, and at-
torneys' fees.6" Jerry sought enforcement of the premarital agree-
ment, taking the position that it barred the relief Mary requested. 5
The trial court held that the agreement permitted division of marital
property.656 It found no defects in the bargaining process but thought
the provision requiring the parties to divorce only on a no-fault
ground was void as against public policy and the provisions waiving
alimony and attorneys' fees substantively unfair at both execution
and enforcement.6 7 In discussing validity of the waivers on execution
of the agreement, it noted the "substantial disparity" between the
parties' economic circumstances and wife's history of health problems
entering the marriage.65 The court also noted that the "agreement
[did] not take into account the length of the marriage or potential
changes in circumstances," especially in a spouse's health, and con-
cluded that the agreement was not fair or equitable at execution. 59
As to fairness at enforcement, the court found a material change in
circumstances since the agreement's execution: Jerry's marital mis-
conduct, including adultery, physical and emotional abuse of Mary,
regular drunkenness, and desertion,' which caused the break-up of
649. See Hardee v. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d 264, 265 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001), aff'd, 585 S.E.2d
501 (S.C. 2003).
650. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d at 502; Hardee, No. 95-DR-43-1751, slip. op. at 16-17. The agree-
ment did require Jerry to pay Mary five thousand dollars for each year of the marriage
and two thousand dollars for moving expenses on separation. Their respective financial
statements showed assets of over one and a half million dollars for him and less than fifty
thousand dollars for her. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d at 265.
651. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d at 265.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 266.
655. Id.
656. Hardee, No. 95-DR-43-1751, slip op. at 24-25.
657. Id. at 27.
658. Id. at 21, 23.
659. Id. at 23.
660. Id. at 36.
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the marriage and contributed to the deterioration in Mary's health."'
The court further found that Mary was totally disabled and would
become a public charge if substantial support was not granted, assert-
ing that "[i]t is not the public policy of this State to require the tax-
payers ... to support spouses under these circumstances. 6 2 The
court awarded Mary a fault divorce against her husband, alimony,
attorneys' and accountants' fees and costs, and thirty percent of the
marital property.6 3
The intermediate appellate court approved the trial court's ap-
proach in determining the agreement's validity, specifically adopting
Georgia's three-pronged test.6 4 However, it reversed the trial court's
holdings on the validity of the waivers, and the supreme court af-
firmed this decision.66 ' Neither court seemed to grasp the essence of
Mary's argument nor the trial court's holding that the agreement was
unconscionable at execution. The intermediate court said that the
agreement was saved by the fact that "although the parties had
vastly different financial resources, the agreement bound each party
equally. 66 This statement glosses over the fact that Jerry's waivers
were worthless because Mary had few assets and no income, having
given up her job at her husband's request.667 The supreme court also
failed to adequately address whether the agreement was unconscio-
nable at execution. It unnecessarily concentrated on procedural fair-
ness, even though Mary never raised that issue in the case.66 In its
view, Mary could have chosen not to sign and not to marry Jerry. 69
The court never focused on her waivers in light of her circumstances
at execution. As to fairness at enforcement, both appellate courts
thought that Mary's deterioration in health, leaving her unable to
work, was foreseeable.67 Both completely ignored Jerry's miscon-
duct during the marriage as a contributing cause and a change in
material circumstances. Indeed the supreme court seemed to think
661. Id. at 39. The court clearly attributed much of the decline in Mary's health to
Jerry's conduct during the marriage.
662. Hardee, No. 95-DR-43-1751, slip op. at 22, 39.
663. Id. at 56-57. Thirty percent of the marital property was valued at $192,461. Id.
664. Hardee v. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d 264, 269, 270 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001), affd, 585 S.E.
2d 501 (S.C. 2003).
665. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d at 504.
666. Hardee, 558 S.E.2d at 270.
667. Id. at 266; Hardee, No. 95-DR-43-1751, slip op. at 11.
668. The court specifically noted a premarital agreement will be held invalid where
there is "the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided con-
tract provisions together with terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person
would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them." Hardee, 585 S.E.2d
at 505.
669. Id.
670. Id.
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that Mary had a good deal with the agreement and the marriage,
observing she received substantial benefits in the form of"a height-
ened standard of living, owning several homes, and driving luxury
cars." '' To her argument that by enforcing the alimony waiver
against her the court was making new law and applying it retroac-
tively, the court said it was merely enforcing a contract.7 2 Like the in-
termediate court, it was not concerned with the issue of public policy
raised by enforcing a contract that resulted in one party going on the
welfare rolls. Ironically, the court voiced fairness to the husband as
a major concern: 'We concur with Husband that it would be unfair
and inequitable to permit a party who, fully aware of serious health
issues and declining health, knowingly signs a prenuptial agreement
against the advice of her attorney, to thereafter recover alimony
and/or support."7 ' In contrast, however, other jurisdictions have in-
validated agreements signed by spouses whose attorneys advised
them against it.6"4
D. Interpretation
All agreements are vulnerable to problems of interpretation.675
Sloppiness and carelessness of the contracting parties, draftsmen,
and courts all contribute to them. '6 A recurring issue for premarital
671. Id. It referred to the marriage as of"five-year duration." Id. Actually it lasted nine
years. See Hardee, No. 95-DR-43-1751, slip op. at 40.
672. Hardee v. Hardee, 585 S.E. 2d 501,505 (S.C. 2003). It nevertheless thought it was
necessary to overrule Towles v. Towles, 182 S.E.2d 53, 55 (S.C. 1971), which pointed to
the conclusion that alimony waivers were void as against public policy. Id. at 504.
673. Id. at 505.
674. The crucial issue remains the impact of enforcing the agreement. See, e.g., Gross
v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 510 (Ohio 1984) (upholding the invalidity of a premarital agree-
ment in spite of the plaintiff's attorney advising plaintiff not to accept the agreement);
Norris v. Norris, 419 A.2d 982, 984, 986 (D.C. 1980) (affirming a lower court's invalidation
of a premarital agreement even though one party's attorney had unavailingly advised
her not to sign it as it was).
675. Four cases not discussed in the body of this article involved questions of inter-
pretation of premarital agreements: Jangula v. Jangula, 2005 ND 203, 706 N.W.2d 85,
88 (holding that husband's subsequent acts of commingling property gave meaning to pre-
marital agreement provision that purported to keep property separate); Rhodes v. Rhodes,
2005 ND 38, 692 N.W. 2d 157, 164 (reviewing trial court's application of premarital
agreement to assets item by item); Rubino v. Rubino, 765 A.2d 1222, 1224, 1226 (R.I.
2001) (holding that acceptance of five thousand dollars from parties' joint bank account
as "advance equitable distribution" was not abandonment of premarital agreement);
Jakopovic v. Brown, 622 N.W.2d 651,656 (Neb. 2001) (holding that spouse had only waived
rights to property specifically listed in premarital agreement); see also Langley v. Langley,
613 S.E.2d 614, 616-617 (Ga. 2005) (determining that husband was not allowed to set off
temporary alimony against lump sum alimony obligation under the agreement) (discussed
supra at notes 540-43).
676. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
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contracts is the scope of the contract or one of its provisions. For ex-
ample, does the agreement apply to dissolution of the marriage by
divorce, by death of a spouse, or by both? Is a particular provision
of the agreement a waiver of alimony or property division?67 7 The
parties litigated the former issue in Binek v. Binek, discussed in Part
II.678 Ruth argued, among other things, that the agreement did not
apply if the parties divorced but only when one of them died.67'9 The
pertinent language said:
Ruth Mayer hereby releases all rights in the property or estate
of Theodore J. Binek which she might have by reason of their
marriage, whether by way of dower, statutory allowance, widow's
allowance, intestate share, or election to take against his will,
under the laws of this or any other jurisdiction that may be appli-
cable, and with particular reference to Section 30.1-05-04, North
Dakota Century Code .... 680
The section of the North Dakota Century Code cited in the agreement
provided for waivers of spousal rights at death.681 The court charac-
terized the provision as "not ambiguous 6 2 but proceeded to rewrite
it, leaving out the enumerated spousal death rights after the word
"marriage. ' Ignoring those words completely enabled the court to
reason that "[a]ny rights in the property [Ruth] would acquire as a
result of a property settlement upon divorce would be rights arising
out of the marriage. Therefore, the agreement applies to property
rights [Ruth] may have acquired from a divorce decree. ''6"
In Wilkes v. Estate of Wilkes, also discussed in Part II," the court
interpreted the premarital agreement as if it applied on dissolution
of the marriage or on death of a spouse, even though the agreement
did not mention that event or the spouses' estates."6 The Wilkes agree-
ment said that "[e]ach [party] wishes to keep all of their [sic] separate
85 (4th ed., Foundation Press 2001) (asserting that lack of attentiveness and ineptitude
on the part of contracting parties, scriveners, and courts contribute more to interpretation
difficulties than do philosophical differences about the meaning of words).
677. For an example of where a husband argued unsuccessfully that language in the
premarital agreement constituted a waiver of marital property division, see Hardee v.
Hardee, discussed supra notes 646-74 and accompanying text.
678. Binek v. Binek, 2004 ND 5673, 673 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 2004), discussed supra Part
II.B.2.
679. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 600.
680. Id.
681. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-04 (2005).
682. Binek, 673 N.W.2d at 600.
683. Id.
684. Id.
685. 27 P.3d 433 (Mont. 2001), discussed supra Part II.B.2.
686. Wilkes, 27 P.3d at 435, 437.
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property, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, free from any
claim of the other by virtue of the forthcoming marriage.""6 ' Counsel
for Mary did not raise the scope of the agreement and the courts did
not discuss it.
Other authorities require greater specificity for death rights
waivers. Two recent cases from Virginia illustrate the point. In Pysell
v. Keck, the parties executed a premarital agreement like that in
Wilkes that kept their property separate during marriage. 8 When
the husband died, his will made no provision for his wife.68 9 She at-
tempted to assert her elective share; the executor of husband's estate
argued that she had waived it in the premarital agreement.6 90 The
court saw "nothing in the unambiguous language" of the agreement
that supported the claim of husband's estate.691' The court said that
a waiver of death rights must be express or established by clear and
convincing evidence.692 The agreement did not mention death or
either spouse's estate; it did not contain an express waiver of wife's
elective share, nor did husband's estate present clear and convincing
evidence that would allow the court to imply one.693 The court there-
fore held that the premarital agreement applied only to the parties as
living persons.694 In Dowling v. Rowan the same court reached the
opposite result on the basis of more specific language.695 The agree-
ment in that case said: 'The purpose of this agreement is to settle the
rights and obligations of each of [the parties], during their marriage,
upon death of either or both of them, or in the case of dissolution of
the marriage. ' 6 ' The court found that the words "upon the death...
of both of them" was exactly the express language lacking in the
Pysell agreement.697
In Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, the New York Court of Appeals was
faced with determining the scope of a waiver in a premarital agree-
ment executed more than thirty years before, when New York law
provided that alimony waivers were void.698 In the agreement the wife
waived all rights "she would otherwise be entitled to because of such
687. Id. at 435.
688. 559 S.E.2d 677, 678 (Va. 2002).
689. Id.
690. Id.
691. Id. at 679.
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Pysell, 559 S.E.2d at 679.
695. 621 S.E.2d 397, 400, 403 (Va. 2005).
696. Id. at 398.
697. Id. at 400. Courts cannot always resolve this issue from the agreement itself and
so must resort sometimes to extrinsic evidence. See In re Estate of Barrows, 913 A.2d 608,
613 (Me. 2006).
698. 764 N.E.2d 950, 951-52 (N.Y. 2001).
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marriage, whether present or future rights, to any and all property
which [prospective husband] has now, or which he may acquire in the
future .... ","'99 When husband began divorce proceedings, wife coun-
terclaimed, asking for an equitable distribution of marital property
under the state's current law.700 Two years into the discovery phase
of the case, husband first raised the premarital agreement, asserting
it as a defense to wife's equitable distribution claim. 0' 1 The trial court
construed the provision as a waiver of spousal support, prohibited by
the law in effect at the time of its execution.7 2 After the intermediate
appellate court agreed, the court of appeals reversed.7"3 Employing
the rule that "where two constructions of a written contract are pos-
sible, preference will be given to that which does not result in violation
of law," it held that the wife waived only her right to the husband's
property then owned or later acquired, not to support.7 4 The court
asserted that this was consistent with the parties' intent because the
husband never contested his duty to provide post-divorce support
until the lower courts voided the agreement as a waiver of it. 7 5 Even
if the lower courts were right and the agreement was indeed intended
as a waiver of support, the court reasoned that its validity should be
governed by current New York law rather than the prohibition in ef-
fect at execution.70 6 Current law70 7 reflected an intervening change
in public policy and thus trumped the law in effect at the time the
agreement was executed.
70 8
Three cases, two discussed earlier, raise another common in-
terpretation question: the effect of an alleged oral understanding at
odds with the written agreement. In Estate of Lutz,"° Lavilla alleged
that Emanuel made an oral promise to take care of her outside the
699. Id. at 951. She also waived the right of election as it existed then or might exist
in the future. Id.
700. Id. at 952.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 952, 954.
704. Bloomfield, 764 N.E.2d at 953.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. New York law now permits alimony waivers but provides that courts may override
them if a waiving spouse is in danger of becoming a public charge. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-311 (2006).
708. The court further held that noncompliance with present execution formalities did
not invalidate the agreement made before their effective date. Bloomfield, 764 N.E.2d
at 953. It remanded to the trial court for a determination of the question of the premarital
agreement's conscionability. Id. at 954. The terms of premarital and postmarital agree-
ments in New York must be "fair and reasonable at the time of the making of the agree-
ment" and "not unconscionable at the time of entry of final judgment." N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAw § 236B(3) (2006).
709. 2000 ND 226, 620 N.W.2d 589.
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premarital agreement.71 ° In reversing summary judgment against
Lavilla during an earlier stage of the litigation, the North Dakota
Supreme Court correctly analyzed the issue in the following terms:
"The factual circumstances of an unfulfilled oral promise would be
additional evidence on the voluntariness of the premarital agreement,
and leaves an additional factual dispute for trial."'711 The supreme
court remanded for a trial of the factual questions on the voluntari-
ness and enforceability of the written premarital agreement in light
of the alleged oral promise."' The trial court found against Lavilla
on voluntariness, even though it never made a specific finding on
whether Emanuel made the promise.713 In affirming, the supreme
court said that the trial court impliedly found he did not.7"4
In Cannon v. Cannon,715 Wendy alleged an oral understanding
that the premarital agreement would be effective only until the on-
going bankruptcy proceedings involving her assets had ended.1 6 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland did not address the issue beyond ac-
knowledging that one of John Cannon's contentions was "that the
trial court incorrectly considered parole evidence in holding the Agree-
ment invalid."'717 This lack of attention is stunning in view of the trial
court's decision to invalidate the agreement on the basis of the oral
understanding and the intermediate court's reversal of the trial court
on the ground that the trial court gave the oral understanding too
much weight.71
In Pierce v. Pierce, a surviving wife sought to establish an implied
understanding as part of a written postmarital agreement.7 9 During
their marriage Agnes worked full-time in a coal mine, and Ted was
mostly unemployed.' About ten years into the marriage, the couple
executed a written agreement whereby Agnes agreed to give Ted her
paychecks, keeping only a small amount of spending money for her-
self.721 In return, Ted promised to leave Agnes his estate at death. 2
The agreement, lost by the time of the litigation, was apparently si-
lent on the question of Ted's ability to transfer assets out of his estate
710. Id. at 592.
711. In re Estate of Lutz, 1997 ND 82, 563 N.W.2d 90 (Lutz 1).
712. Id. at 102.
713. In re Estate of Emanuel Lutz, No. 94-C-2850, slip op. at 7 (S. Cent. Jud. Dist.
N.D. June 30, 1998).
714. In re Estate of Emanuel Lutz, 2000 ND 226, 620 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Lutz III).
715. 865 A.2d 563 (Md. 2005).
716. Id. at 567.
717. Id. at 585-86.
718. Id. at 567.
719. 994 P.2d 193, 195, 199 (Utah 2000).
720. Id. at 195.
721. Id.
722. Id.
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during his life without Agnes's consent.723 Less than two months be-
fore he died, Ted left home and moved in with defendants, his nephew
and his nephew's wife.724 Ted made a number of gratuitous transfers
to them of stock and real estate without Agnes's consent.725 Ted died
intestate, and Agnes, individually and as his personal representative,
challenged the transfers based on her understanding that they were
prohibited by the postmarital agreement. 726 The trial court, with the
aid of a special jury verdict, found that the transfers did not violate
the agreement.727 On appeal the Utah Supreme Court rescued Agnes
by employing a combination of the doctrine of consideration and fidu-
ciary principles. If Ted could give away substantial portions of his
property, the agreement with Agnes would lack consideration flowing
from him to her and would ignore his overriding fiduciary duty to her
as his spouse.729 It thus rejected the trial court's holding and the
special jury verdict that the postmarital agreement allowed Ted to
give away his property freely.730 It remanded to the trial court for a
determination of whether the gifts exceeded "the limitation the agree-
ment placed upon [Ted's] ability to give away substantial portions of
his property.,
731
III. DISCONCERTING TRENDS
A. Overview
Premarital agreements are the primary tool of private breakup
planning, and most of the cases within the scope of this article involve
them. Therefore, in identifying trends, premarital agreements provide
the focus of this discussion. Enforcing premarital agreements is con-
sistently justified as enhancing the parties' autonomy by allowing
them freedom to contract and tailor settlements on breakup to their
own situations and satisfactions, exemplary goals. 732 Anyone who dis-
putes the benefits of breakup planning may be accused of antiquarian
paternalism.733 Yet it is perfectly clear from the cases that it is always
723. Id. at 195-96.
724. Id. at 195.
725. Pierce, 994 P.2d at 195-96.
726. Id. at 196.
727. Id.
728. Id. at 199-200.
729. Id. at 200.
730. Id.
731. Pierce, 994 P.2d at 200.
732. See id. at 890.
733. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) ("Paternalistic pre-
sumptions and protections [impairing spouses' right to contract with each other] that arose
to shelter women from the inferiorities and incapacities which they were perceived as
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one member of the couple, the one with the assets, whose autonomy
is preserved and whose satisfactions are achieved by execution and
enforcement of these agreements.3 Similarly the reformers in this
field have stated their goals in theoretically unexceptionable terms, for
example, to eliminate "uncertainty" and "lack of uniformity," thought
to be the product of a "spasmodic, reflexive response to varying factual
circumstances at different times,'7 35 rather than of basic policy con-
flicts among the states, and to achieve "consensus... on the appro-
priate rules to apply" to premarital agreements and the rationales
to explain them.
7 31
Although it may be too soon to assess the effect, if any, of the pro-
posed A.L.I. reforms, the accomplishments of the Uniform Act, now
adopted in twenty-six jurisdictions, are clear. 1 The Act has facilitated
enforcement of an increasing number of these contracts.738 Interest-
ingly, enforcement philosophy has been contagious; it has slipped over
state borders and infected non-ULA jurisdictions as well. Thus, pre-
marital agreements, one-sided by definition,7 39 are being enforced
more frequently than ever across American jurisdictions. This in-
creased enforcement would be tolerable as long as courts respected
"minimum decencies '740 in the process. Three disconcerting trends
suggest that courts are not meeting these standards: conflicting de-
cisions on similar facts within the same jurisdiction, and other judicial
errors in resolving these cases; removal of substance from substantive
fairness reviews at both execution and enforcement with a concomi-
tant disregard for dependent spouses; and mythifying procedural fair-
ness by upholding agreements entered under subtle coercion, with-
out independent representation or concern for legal ethics or proper
disclosure.
having in earlier times have, appropriately, been discarded.").
734. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW.
U. L. REv. 65, 67 (1998).
735. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGMT. ACT, pref. note, 9c U.L.A. 36 (2001).
736. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, § 7.01 cmt. a.
737. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGMT. ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted (2001).
738. See Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family
Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 231, 234 (2001).
739. The courts readily concede that premarital agreements treat the contracting parties
unequally. See, e.g., DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Mass. 2002) ("Many
valid agreements may be one sided, and a contesting party may have considerably fewer
assets and enjoy a far different lifestyle after divorce than he or she may enjoy during
the marriage.").
740. See Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0.
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)) (writing about the "minimum decencies... a court will insist
upon as essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type, or as being inherent in a
bargain of that type").
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B. Conflicting Cases and Other Errors
One can see that since 2000 the highest courts of four states have
rendered conflicting decisions in cases with similar facts and issues.741
In two of these jurisdictions, the courts did so without seeming to
recognize the conflicts.742 In two others, the courts offered uncon-
vincing attempts to reconcile or distinguish the cases.743 Courts have
also made elementary mistakes in interpretation, changed standards
during the course of litigation, applied these standards without notice
to the parties, and condoned results that offend established policy.
Whether these bad decisions are deliberate or the result of negligence
and inattention, the fault of lawyers or judges, they remain disturb-
ing. Unfortunately, these decisions diminish the credibility of the
legal system by according different legal outcomes to similar facts,
defeating legitimate expectations of parties, and failing to produce
just results.
C. Decline of Substance and Disregard for Dependent Spouses
Divorcing wives or widows made substantive challenges to pre-
marital agreements in nineteen of the cases covered by this article.
All but one failed. Courts upheld agreements containing "draconian"
terms as fair at execution. At second-look reviews, courts deemed all
subsequent events, including the birth of children; marital miscon-
duct, such as physical abuse and adultery; lengthy marriages; dispro-
portionate growth in one spouse's assets; and being cast on to welfare
by enforcement of the contract to have been "foreseeable" events at
the time of execution so that enforcement of the agreement despite
them was not unfair or unconscionable. In a single exception, finan-
cial disparity between the spouses at divorce was enough to invali-
date an alimony waiver and to support a three-year rehabilitative
award. Together the decisions display a lamentable disregard for the
spouse who, in the interest of the relationship, gives up the produc-
tion of income to devote herself to the joint family enterprise. 44 Due
741. See supra Part II for a discussion of the Wilkes and Shirilla cases from Montana,
the Peters-Riemers and Binek cases from North Dakota, the Hollett and Yannalfo cases
from New Hampshire, and the Alexander, Mallen, and Corbett cases from Georgia.
742. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the Wilkes and Shirilla cases from
Montana and the Peters-Riemers and Binek cases from North Dakota.
743. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the Hollett and Yannalfo cases from New
Hampshire, and supra Part II.B.4 for a discussion of the Alexander, Mallen, and Corbett
cases from Georgia.
744. Despite woman's "emancipation," traditional roles continue to prevail. See
PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at § 5.04 cmt c. ("[R]ecent data demonstrates a strong
persistence in traditional marriage roles, such that wives continue, in the great majority
of cases, to sacrifice earnings opportunities to care for their children, in reliance upon
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to the enforcement of the one-sided agreement, she is left to carry the
whole financial risk when the marriage fails. As the courts enforce
alimony and other waivers that leave the formerly dependent spouse
in a much worse financial position than she would have been under
the otherwise applicable marital property regime, they make some re-
vealing statements. As the court stated in DeMatteo, "it is only where
the contesting party is essentially stripped of substantially all marital
interests that a judge may determine that an antenuptial agreement
is not 'fair and reasonable'... .. ,,74Apparently, it may be fair and rea-
sonable to enforce an agreement in favor of a wealthy ex-spouse that
puts the other in need of public assistance. Another judge sought to
justify such a result by asserting that "a spouse or widow. . is in the
same monetary position regardless of whether the support came from
the estate of the deceased spouse or from the public treasury.746
Thus, the dependent ex-spouse is treated as a disposable asset that
can be discarded at the end of the marriage and whose support the
other ex-spouse can pass off to the rest of society. Such a state of the
law reflects badly on marriage, which modern rhetoric describes as an
"equal partnership. 747 In a truly equal partnership, the partners' con-
tributions may vary but they nevertheless share financial risks of the
partnership's failure equally. If marriage is to survive as an insti-
tution, the partner who gives up income for the benefit of the family
unit needs assurance that she can do so without risking destitution
at the partnership's end.
D. The Mythification of Procedural Fairness
The decline of substantive review enhances the importance of pro-
cedural fairness, yet when one turns to the policing of procedure the
picture is equally bleak. Parties in twenty cases made procedural chal-
lenges, including three involving postnuptial agreements.748 Courts
in only seven cases sustained these challenges. These numbers can-
not be heralded as a sign that procedural fairness is the norm; five of
the cases in which courts sustained the procedural challenges came
from jurisdictions in which there was a conflicting decision on similar
facts, thus making their precedential value questionable. Ten of the
cases in which the procedural challenge failed were wrongly decided,
continued market labor by their husbands.").
745. DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797, 809 (Mass. 2002).
746. In re Estate of Lutz, 1999 ND 121, 595 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Glaser, J., dissenting)
(Lutz II).
747. See, e.g., Developments - The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2075
(2003) (arguing against total enforcement of premarital agreements based on "marriage
as contract" theory because it is at odds with "marriage as partnership" concept).
748. See supra Part II.
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and the challenge should have succeeded. The courts' sense of what
is procedurally fair is just as deficient as their decisions on substance.
The litigated cases reveal a recurring pattern: the prospective spouse
with the greater assets and earning power wants the agreement, has
it drafted by his lawyer, and presents it to the other spouse very close
to the time of the impending marriage, when her mind is on wedding
preparations and she has little patience for unromantic legal docu-
ments.749 More often than not the proposed agreement is accompanied
by an ultimatum that if she does not sign it, the would-be husband
will cancel the wedding. She signs it, and when the relationship dete-
riorates, the voluntariness of the agreement often becomes an issue.
As the cases demonstrate, the prevailing view is that prospective hus-
band's ultimatum75 ° is not the kind of coercion that makes an agree-
ment involuntary. Interestingly the only case in which the court of
last resort found the agreement coerced was one that husband had
signed at wife's insistence.7 1 Via their decisions, the courts need to
acknowledge that the family context is different from the commer-
cial. Both insistence on a premarital agreement as a condition for
marriage and insistence on a postmarital agreement for staying in
a marriage are potentially coercive. As Trebilcock and Elliott ob-
serve, "threatening to breach a contract may have a coercive effect
if the contract cannot be effectively enforced."7 2 Of course, neither
promises to marry nor promises to stay married are presently ca-
pable of enforcement.
A further inquiry into voluntariness must consider the role of
counsel. That a party was represented by independent counsel has
been said repeatedly to be the "best evidence" that a party made an
agreement voluntarily.753 Yet independent counsel for both parties
is required in only two jurisdictions and limited to only two cir-
cumstances: in California for alimony waivers to be valid7 4 and in
Minnesota for postmarital agreements.755 Other jurisdictions require
749. She may be suffering from other distractions, such as pregnancy, a fear that pro-
spective husband will cease to love her if she does not sign, an altruistic trust in his assur-
ances that he will take care of her, or blinding love that will prevent her from appreciating
the possibility that the agreement could be enforced some day in the future.
750. These ultimatums are often accompanied by reassuring statements that prospective
husband will take care of wife, that the agreement is a mere formality, that it is required
by his parents, and the like. Several lower courts correctly held that such actions indeed
constituted coercion. They were overruled by the courts of last resort.
751. See Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004) supra Part II.B.10.
752. Trebilcock & Elliott, supra note 5, at 59.
753. See, e.g., In re Estate of Crawford, 730 P.3d 675, 678 (Wash. 1986); Gant v. Gant,
329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985); In re Estate of Lutz, 1997 ND 82, 563 N.W.2d 90, 98
(Lutz 1).
754. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (2006).
755. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11, subd. la(c) (2005).
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only that each party have an opportunity to consult independent
counsel, and in others the presence or absence of independent counsel
is just one of the factors to be considered in determining whether an
agreement was voluntarily entered.756 In a small number of cases
both parties are represented by independent counsel, but clearly that
situation is the exception rather than the norm.757 In fourteen of the
twenty-six cases in which the wife challenged the premarital agree-
ment, she was completely unrepresented at the agreement's execu-
tion.7"' In a fifteenth, the challenger had a lawyer who did not speak
his client's language and could not effectively translate the agree-
ment or explain its terms or the rights his client gave up by signing
it.759 In four other cases, both parties had some representation, but
the challengers' lawyers were procured and/or paid by the other party
or their counsel or were connected to them in some other way,7 ° thus
raising questions about their independence. In many of these cases
the prospective husband presented the agreement in such close prox-
imity to the wedding date that the unrepresented party had no real
opportunity to acquire meaningful representation (despite many
courts' statements to the contrary).761 In another, the lawyer who did
represent the party had insufficient time to review and negotiate im-
provements to it adequately. 762 These common patterns raise ethical
756. For example, California looks at the presence of independent counsel only as a
factor in determining voluntariness. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (c) (2006).
757. See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006); DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762
N.E.2d 797, 801 (Mass. 2002).
758. Namely, Bonds, discussed supra Part II.B.1; Alexander, discussed supra Part II.B.4;
Adams, discussed supra Part II.C.2.a; Mallen, discussed supra Part II.B.4; Corbett, dis-
cussed supra Part II.B.4; Hoag, discussed supra Part II.B.7; Cannon, discussed supra
Part II.B.9; Wilkes, discussed supra Part II.B.2; Yannalfo, discussed supra Part II.B.3;
Bloomfield, discussed supra Part II.D; Binek, discussed supra Part II.B.2; Peters-Riemers,
discussed supra Part II.B.2; Lutz, discussed supra Part II.B.9; Marsocci, discussed supra
Part II.B.11.
759. Shirilla, supra Part II.B.2.
760. Namely, DeMatteo, discussed supra Part II.C.2.b (prospective wife's counsel paid
by prospective husband); Hollett, discussed supra Part II.B.3 (same); Porreco, discussed
supra Part II.B.5 (prospective wife's lawyer was prospective husband's tenant); Friezo,
discussed supra Part II.B.6 (prospective wife's counsel was incompetent and was procured
by prospective husband and his sister-in-law).
761. See, for example, Binek, discussed supra Part II.B.2; Yannalfo, discussed supra
Part II.B.3.
762. See In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 352 (N.H. 2003) ('Fairness demands that
the party presented with the agreement have 'an opportunity to seek independent advice
and a reasonable time to reflect on the proposed terms."') (quoting Lutgert v. Lutgert,
338 So. 2d 1111, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(2)
(West 2006) (requiring that a presenting party provide seven days between presentment
and signing of a premarital agreement in order for the other party to obtain legal repre-
sentation); PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at § 7.04(a)(3) (requiring that the agreement was
executed thirty days before the marriage in order to show that it was entered into with
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questions that lawyers and courts generally ignore, and which the
California legislature complicated when it amended the state's Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act in response to the supreme court's decision
in Bonds.763
The lawyer who faces the possibility of dealing with an unrepre-
sented party does so at his peril. He has to be wary of misleading the
unrepresented party about whom he represents.7" He cannot portray
himself as disinterested or as having the interests of the unrepre-
sented party at heart. The only advice he can ethically give the unrep-
resented party is to consult his or her own lawyer.765 However, he can-
not stop there; if he is wise, he will memorialize that advice in writing
and have the unrepresented party verify that he gave it by signing
the writing. Similarly, if the unrepresented party does not follow the
advice and refuses independent counsel, the lawyer should memori-
alize that choice in writing as well. If he does not, he may find himself
in the unenviable position of having to take the stand in defense of his
practices and reputation, as happened in Wilkes766 and Lutz."6 To its
credit, the Supreme Court of North Dakota underscored the impor-
tance of the lawyer's duties in its first decision in Lutz by reversing
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Emanuel's
estate.7 68 It stated:
Here, the evidence conflicts on whether [Lutz's lawyer] actually
advised [prospective wife] to obtain independent counsel. [He]
testified he did. [She] ... disputes this and testified she believed
[he] was her attorney and relied on him as an advisor. Her belief
is understandable since [he] also prepared her will. Whether [he]
adequately advised [her] about his potential conflict of interest,
her need to have independent counsel, and the effect of her con-
sent to his dual representation are disputed material facts that
preclude summary judgment." 9
When the trial court later failed to make any express findings on the
subject, the supreme court unfortunately chose not to press the point,
instead implying trial court findings favorable to Emanuel's estate.7 °
informed consent, in part so that each party has ample time to seek representation
before the wedding).
763. CAL FAM. CODE § 1615 (C) (2006).
764. MODEL R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2004).
765. Id.
766. 27 P.3d 433 (Mont. 2001), discussed supra Part II.B.2.
767. 563 N.W.2d 90, 98-99 (N.D. 1997) (Lutz 1).
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. In re Estate of Lutz, 2000 ND 226, 620 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Lutz II).
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Although this seems like a disappointing dropping of the ethical ball,
none of the other courts ever managed to catch it. Like the California
legislature, they seem aloof to the ethical duties and dilemmas of
lawyers who deal with unrepresented parties, or to the fact that the
parties in these cases had conflicting interests when the agreements
were executed. In addition to advising an unrepresented party to seek
counsel and memorializing the advice and any waiver in writing, the
lawyer, if he is to do everything he can to make his client's agreement
enforceable, will have to fully inform the unrepresented party of its
terms and basic effects and the rights and obligations she will forfeit
by signing it. 7 ' This advising seems to put the lawyer in a position of
conflict, acting for his client as well as the unrepresented party. It
has been suggested, therefore, that to protect himself in California,
he needs still another writing signed by his own client recognizing the
possible conflict from dual representation and waiving or consenting
to it.
772
In the second set of circumstances in which the represented party
pays for the other's representation or has some other connection to
that lawyer, ethical rules require that the lawyer disclose the fee
arrangement or other connection, explaining it as creating a possible
conflict of interest, and getting her to consent to or waive the con-
flict.7 3 This disclosure, explanation, and waiver or consent should be
in writing as well.7 Apparently, in none of the cases posing this sit-
uation did the lawyer undertake all these steps, nor did any of the
courts rebuke him for such inattentiveness. Most importantly, the
single court to invalidate an agreement on the basis of an ethical in-
fraction was reversed on appeal.775
In contrast to an unrepresented party, who is at a great disad-
vantage, the well-represented party is likely to have the information
she needs to enter the agreement voluntarily. Her lawyer will see to
it that the other party to the proposed agreement makes full financial
disclosure and explain her legal rights if there were no agreement and
771. This too must be in writing and delivered to the unrepresented party on or before
signing of the agreement. Additionally, the unrepresented party will have to execute a
document declaring he or she received the information and who provided it before the
signing of the agreement.
772. John G. Gherini, Comment, The California Supreme Court Swings and Misses
in Defining the Scope and Enforceability of Premarital Agreements, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 151,
178 (2001); see also PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at § 7.04(3)(c)(iii) (requiring agreement to
state that parties' interests may be adverse in a situation where not both parties are
represented).
773. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8(o (2004).
774. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4).
775. Friezo v. Friezo, No. FA020190070, 2004 WL 2165045 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2004), rev'd, 2007 WL 268897 (Conn. Feb. 6, 2007).
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what she forfeits by signing it. She will thus acquire what she needs
to know by virtue of her lawyer's efforts on her behalf. This is not to
say that the law governing required disclosure is entirely satisfactory.
One of the backward steps the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
took, again in the interest of enhancing the enforceability of these
contracts, was to relegate disclosure to secondary status by making
it a requisite only to sanitize the unconscionable contract, and ex-
pendable altogether if waived or if the challenger had actual knowl-
edge of the other's assets.776 Thus, under the Act as promulgated, an
unconscionable contract will be invalid only if fair and reasonable
disclosure was not made before execution.777 The Act contains no lan-
guage that includes disclosure in the voluntariness requirement.
In this connection, the California "Bonds amendment" is an im-
provement. By requiring that an unrepresented party be given an
explanation of the terms of the contract and its effect as well as the
rights she forfeits by signing it, it ties disclosure to voluntariness.7
The amendment thus restores the primary importance of disclosure
for contractual validity. Nevertheless, the cases further dilute its re-
quirement by holding that the prospective wife "knew enough" about
the prospective husband's finances when no disclosure was made,
that disclosure was sufficient even though it attached no values to
the listed assets, and by transforming the duty to disclose by the
wealthier party into a duty to investigate by the less wealthy party.
In the ideal world, neither party should have a duty to investigate,
rather each party should have a duty to fully inform.
CONCLUSION
Premarital, postmarital, and cohabitation agreements, attractive
in theory as giving power to parties to craft their own bargains, are
becoming instruments of oppression in practice. By enforcing them
the courts are enabling the dominant party to acquire financial ad-
vantages and to shift the risk of a failed relationship from him, even
though he can afford to bear it, to her, the weaker party who cannot
easily bear such a burden. These judicial decisions work not only to
her detriment but to the public's detriment as well.
Certainly one should consider some improvements to ensure that
minimum decencies for these contracts are observed. These minimum
decencies would necessitate independent counsel for each party as a
776. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGMT. ACT § 6(a)(2) (1983).
777. Id.
778. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (c)(3) (2006).
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baseline requisite for enforcement with the concomitant conditions
that a party would have ample time for legal consultation and money
to pay for the services. The party who wants the agreement should
have to provide both, and any possible conflicts must be explained
and expressly waived in writing.
Two more specific rules seem essential to the minimum decen-
cies. First, an agreement should be unenforceable to the extent it
would place a party on the public rolls. Second, where one party gives
up income and assumes the role of homemaker to benefit the relation-
ship, the agreement must include some reasonable provision for that
party's support after dissolution of the marriage. Courts should deter-
mine reasonableness in light of the length of the marriage and the
financial resources of the dominant party.
A second possible improvement would be to require advance
court approval for these agreements. This improvement would entail
a judicial inquiry before the agreement was executed and findings by
the court that the agreement serves the parties' best interests77 9 and
that they understand the governing principles and rules. ' ° Perhaps
the best solution would be to cease to enforce any of these agreements
and to relegate them to merely advisory status, relevant only to show
what the parties might have thought would be fair for their breakup
at the time of execution. That solution is probably unacceptable to the
vested interests, notably those of lawyers and wealthy clients who
have assets they want to protect, although it is the law in England
and parts of Canada.7"'
779. An agreement in the best interests of the parties would, as a matter of law, leave
no possibility for a dependent spouse to go on welfare as a result of the agreement's
enforcement and must provide reasonable support for a dependent ex-spouse. Enforcing
a best interests standard would ensure the agreement's substantive fairness.
780. Judicial preapproval is required for some postmarital agreements in Louisiana.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2329 (2006). Nevertheless, "the effect of [Louisiana] court approval
is unclear, particularly in a subsequent proceeding to attack the matrimonial agreement."
Boyer v. Boyer, 691 So. 2d 1234, 1243 (La. Ct. App. 1997). The procedure of "ante-mortem
probate" in a few states serves as an analogous regime. In it, a testator initiates an ad-
versary proceeding to determine the validity of a will before he dies, naming all bene-
ficiaries under the will and heirs apparent as parties. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202
(2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West 2006). For
a discussion of ante-mortem probate, see generally John H. Langbein, Living Probate:
The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1978).
781. PRINCIPLES, supra note 6, at § 7.02 cmt. a.
